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Mark Boyle and Rob Kitchin  
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Over the past decade a growing number of 
countries have become interested in 
revisiting, refreshing and rebuilding 
relations with their overseas populations. A 
new field of public policy, referred to as 
diaspora strategy, has emerged. A diaspora 
strategy is an explicit policy initiative or 
series of policy initiatives enacted by a 
sending state, or its peoples, aimed at 
fortifying and developing relationships with 
expatriate communities, diasporic 
populations, and foreign constituencies who 
share a special affinity.   Notwithstanding 
their obvious differences,  many countries 
are seeing merit in sharing experiences and 
through joint ‘policy transfer’ workshops, 
seminars, publications, toolkit manuals, and 
conferences are participating in an important 
global dialogue on international best practice 
with respect to the design and 
implementation of diaspora strategies.  
Given that 2.8 million Canadian citizens live 
overseas (equivalent to 8% of the national 
population), including in such powerful 
economies as the United States and Greater 
China, not surprisingly within Canada too 
there now exists an embryonic interest in the 
possibility of formulating a Canadian 
diaspora strategy to enhance and build 
relations with this ‘secret province’. The 
Asian Pacific Foundation of Canada in 
Vancouver, an independent think-tank on 
Canada's relations with Asia, has launched a 
dedicated research program titled 
‘Canadians Abroad’ which is seeking to 
understand the Canadian diaspora and to 
promote new thinking on how transnational 
connections might be better developed. 
Meanwhile, the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) in 
Ottawa has established a high level 
‘brainstorming’ working group to consider 
the possibility of rolling out a ‘Global 
Citizens’ initiative which is fundamentally 
interested in harnessing the Canadian 
diaspora to support Canadian foreign policy 
and trade interests internationally. Although 
both posture only as preliminary 
explorations at this point, it is clear that 
diaspora strategy is steadily starting to assert 
itself as a priority area within Canadian 
public discourse.     
This report contends that any consideration 
of the virtues and vices of developing a 
diaspora strategy for Canada might be 
enhanced if the Canadian case is set into 
international context and if Canada draws 
from and contributes to the emerging global 
dialogue on diaspora strategies.  The 
primary purpose of the report is to furnish 
interested parties in Canada with a summary 
overview of the more important and 
pioneering strategic interventions, 
institutional innovations and policy 
initiatives being undertaken globally. Our 
overview provides a comprehensive survey 
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of existing international practice in the field 
of diaspora strategy and includes (but is not 
limited to) the specific experiences of six 
countries who have been particularly active 
in leading debate across the past decade: 
Ireland, New Zealand, Scotland, Armenia, 
China, and India. We begin with a 
discussion of Canada’s recent turn towards 
its diaspora and argue that the work 
completed to date by the Asia Pacific 
Foundation’s Canadians Abroad Programme 
and laterally the DFAIT Global Citizens 
Project, has resulted in the specification of at 
least five critical questions or challenges for 
Canada:  
a) Why might Canada benefit from a more 
strategic engagement with its overseas 
citizens? 
b) Which institution(s) within Canada 
should be tasked with the responsibility 
of formulating and overseeing a 
diaspora strategy and should a new 
institution be created for this purpose? 
c) Should and can the Canadian 
government play an enhanced role in 
building the Canadianess of the 
Canadian diaspora and work to harness 
the Canadian diaspora as a resource in 
the formulation of Canadian foreign 
policy and diplomacy? 
d) How can the Canadian diaspora be 
harnessed so as to improve the 
competitiveness of Canadian business 
and to stimulate Canadian economic 
development? 
e) What challenges does the Canadian 
diaspora present to Canadian citizenship 
policy and how should Canadian 
approaches to citizenship respond? 
We then take each of these five questions in 
turn and review the ways in which they are 
being raised and handled in other countries; 
in so doing we reflect upon what Canada 
might learn from and in turn contribute to 
international practice. The report is careful 
to avoid advocating specific policy 
prescriptions for Canada or to make 
premature assertions as to specific 
innovations which Canada might borrow, 
copy, and rework. But it does conclude by 
naming a selection of pioneering innovations 
and provocative exemplars which we hope, 
if studied and further debated, will serve to 
enrich the Canadian debate.  
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 1. INTRODUCTION  
Over the past decade a growing number of 
countries have become interested in 
revisiting, refreshing and rebuilding 
relations with their overseas populations. A 
new field of public policy, referred to as 
diaspora strategy, has emerged. Given that 
2.8 million Canadian citizens live overseas 
(equivalent to 8% of the national population) 
not surprisingly within Canada too there 
now exists an embryonic interest in the 
possibility of formulating a Canadian 
diaspora strategy to enhance and build 
relations with this ‘secret province’. The 
Asian Pacific Foundation of Canada in 
Vancouver, an independent think-tank on 
Canada's relations with Asia, has launched a 
special program titled ‘Canadians Abroad’ 
which is seeking to map and better 
understand the Canadian diaspora and to 
promote new thinking on how transnational 
connections might be better developed 
(Zhang 2007a, DeVoretz 2009a). 
Meanwhile, the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) in 
Ottawa has established a high level 
‘brainstorming’ working group to consider 
the possibility of rolling out a ‘Global 
Citizens’ initiative. This initiative is 
interested in exploring the possible 
harnessing of the Canadian diaspora to 
support Canadian foreign policy and trade 
interests internationally.  
A cursory glance at existing international 
practice suggests that a wide range of 
different institutions, strategies, policies, 
programmes, and schemes are being 
developed and implemented across countries 
dependent upon the scale, history, 
geography, and nature of particular diaspora; 
the ‘foreign affairs’ institutional capacities 
which exist in sending countries, and; 
homeland conditions, motivations and 
aspirations. Nevertheless notwithstanding 
their obvious differences,  many countries 
are seeing merit in sharing experiences and 
through joint ‘policy transfer’ workshops, 
seminars, publications, toolkit manuals, and 
conferences are participating in an important 
global dialogue on international best practice 
with respect to the design and 
implementation of diaspora strategies.  
Any consideration of the virtues and vices of 
developing a diaspora strategy for Canada 
might be enhanced if the Canadian case is 
set into international context and if Canada 
draws from and contributes to the emerging 
global dialogue. The primary purpose of this 
report is to furnish interested parties in 
Canada with a summary overview of the 
more important and pioneering strategic 
interventions, institutional innovations and 
policy initiatives being undertaken globally. 
Our overview provides a comprehensive 
survey of existing international practice in 
the field of diaspora strategy and includes 
six countries whom have been particularly 
active in this area across the past decade: 
Ireland, New Zealand, Scotland, Armenia, 
China, and India. Whilst some country case 
studies bear more relevance to Canada than 
others, our purpose is not to prejudge from 
where lessons might be learned. In our 
experience countries can and do glean 
insights from each other and can and do 
effect policy transfers in spite of their 
dissimilarity. Equally the report is careful to 
avoid advocating specific policy 
prescriptions for Canada or to make 
premature assertions as to specific 
innovations which Canada might borrow, 
copy, and rework. But it does include some 
reflection on the implications of 
international practice for Canada and does 
identify a list of innovative programmes 
which might prove to be of particular 
interest should Canada decide to move 
forward in this field.  
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Our review is organized to reflect our own 
prior research and distinctive approach to 
global comparative analyses (Ancien, Boyle 
and Kitchin 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, Boyle, 
Kitchin and Ancien 2009; Kitchin and Boyle 
2010). However, it also aligns itself with 
and, in many ways complements, other 
important commentaries on diaspora 
strategizing (Newland and Patrick 2004, 
Kutzensov 2006, Levitt and Jaworsky 2007, 
Gamlen 2008, Aikins, Sands and White 
2009). In particular, we note the valuable 
series of research reports on diaspora 
engagement produced by the Migration 
Policy Institute in association with USAid in 
2010. These papers examine respectively 
diaspora entrepreneurship, diaspora 
investment in capital markets, diaspora 
tourism, diaspora philanthropy, diaspora 
volunteering, and diaspora advocacy 
(gathered in Newland 2010). We begin with 
a discussion of Canada’s recent turn towards 
its diaspora and argue that the work 
completed to date by the Asia Pacific 
Foundation’s Canadians Abroad Project and 
laterally the DFAIT Global Citizens Project 
has raised at least five critical questions or 
challenges for Canada. We then take each of 
these five questions in turn and review the 
ways in which they are being raised and 
handled in other countries. In so doing, we 
reflect upon what Canada might learn from 
and in turn contribute to international 
practice. We conclude by identifying a 
specific selection of pioneering innovations 
and provocative exemplars which we hope 
will prove to be useful reference material 
which will enrich the Canadian debate.  
To begin, a brief note on definitional matters 
is in order. To date those who promulgate a 
need for diaspora strategies have sought to 
make decisions on three critical definitional 
matters. First, whether the term diaspora is 
an appropriate label for the populations they 
seek to engage per se. and whether they 
might be prepared to deploy the category 
even if only to bring their initiatives into 
international debates. A by now legion of 
social scientific excavation of the genealogy 
and mobilization of the category confirms 
that its current celebrity status in academic, 
policy, and public circles has come at the 
price of definitional clarity (Safran 1991, 
Cohen 1997, and Tsagarousianou 2004).  
Secondly, the extent to which diaspora 
strategies should target only native born 
diasporic populations or national citizens or 
whether it might be broadened to 
incorporate all populations with an affinity 
for a particular homeland irrespective of 
their nationality. A range of non nationals - 
the so called affinity diaspora - and for a 
variety of reasons often feel inclined to 
contribute to particular countries; courting 
these wider audiences has positive and 
negative ramifications. Finally, the degree to 
which diasporic populations should be 
bracketed by generation; whether attention 
be afforded strictly to first generation 
migrants, at most second generation, at most 
third generation, and so on. Indeed in the 
case of some nations, national groupings 
have never held citizenship of the state to 
which they feel a primary sense of belonging 
- the state may have been created long after 
the nation was born; these groups cannot be 
ignored but what status are they to be 
accorded? We will refrain from fastening on 
any particular definition of diaspora and will 
insist instead that definitional matters form 
part of diaspora strategies and are not 
innocent or neutral antecedents to such 
strategies. Clearly decisions on definitions 
lead to the inclusion and exclusion of 
different population groupings and as a 
consequence carry important implications 
for the types of diaspora strategies which 
might be imagined (Ho 2011). 
 
A Diaspora Strategy for Canada? Page 8 
 
2. THE ASIA PACIFIC 
FOUNDATION: LEADING 
CANADA’S TURN TOWARDS A 
MORE SYSTEMATIC DIASPORA 
STRATEGY  
Hitherto, public discourse on the Canadian 
expatriate community, to the extent it has 
arisen, has focused upon the impacts of 
Canadian migration to the United States 
(often speculatively referred to as a ‘brain 
drain’) on the Canadian economy. Prompted 
in part by the evacuation of nearly 15,000 
Canadian passport holders from Lebanon in 
2006, the then imminent review of Canadian 
policy towards dual citizenship, and 
Canadian diplomatic unrest over the 
conviction of a Canadian citizen in China on 
charges of terrorism, in 2008 the Asian 
Pacific Foundation of Canada launched a 
systematic research program titled 
‘Canadians Abroad’. The objective of this 
program was to map and profile Canadians 
living abroad, to produce a balanced and 
comprehensive overview of the strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats 
presented by the Canadian expatriate 
community and; to consider whether Canada 
needed to think more strategically about its 
diaspora rather than dealing with problems 
as they arose on a case by case bases. The 
work of the Asia Pacific Foundation has 
served to produce important estimates of the 
scale and geography of the emigrant 
population, insights into the socio-economic 
and attitudinal profiles of emigrants, and 
understandings of the connections which 
already exist between diasporic communities 
and Canada. Now nearing completion, the 
Canadians Abroad programme is turning its 
attention to the consequences of the 
Canadian diaspora for Canada and how 
Canada might respond so as to best engage 
its overseas populations.  
Because emigration and immigration are 
substantially linked in Canada,  it is first 
necessary to set the work of the Asian 
Pacific Foundation against the backdrop of 
Canada’s long history of immigration (Boyd 
and Vickers 2000, Bourne and Rose 2001, 
and Ley 1999 provide useful overviews). 
Record numbers of immigrants settled in 
Canada in the early 1900s. By 1931 2.3 
million or 22% of Canadians were foreign 
born, deriving principally from Europe and 
in particular from the United Kingdom.  
Because immigration levels declined during 
the 1930s Great Depression and in the 
ensuing years of the second world war, the 
proportion of foreign-born dropped to 17.5% 
(2 million) in 1941 and 14.7% (2 million) in 
1951, but subsequently recovered and has 
since grown again, to 15.6% (2.8 million) in 
1961, 15.3% (3.3 million) in 1971, 16% (3.8 
million) in 1981, 16.1%  (4.3 million) in 
1991 and 18.4% (5.5 million) in 2001. In 
2006, 19.8% of Canada’s population (or 6.2 
million) was foreign born (Chui, Maheux, 
Kelly 2007). Whilst in 1971 migrants from 
Europe constituted 61.6% of all newcomers, 
by 2006 they comprised only 16.1% of all 
newcomers.  Meanwhile whilst in 1971 
migrants born in Asia (including the Middle 
East) made up only 12.1% of recent 
newcomers, by 2006 such migrants 
constituted the largest proportion of 
newcomers to Canada at 58.3% (Chui, 
Maheux, Kelly 2007).  In 2006 863,100 
individuals, or 2.8%, of the national 
population reported holding both Canadian 
citizenship and at least one other citizenship. 
The majority (85.1%) of foreign-born 
migrants who were eligible for Canadian 
citizenship in 2006 had become naturalized. 
Long regarded as a home to immigrants 
from around the world, Canada is less well 
known for its own large diaspora. Indeed in 
2007 Zhang referred to his seminal search 
for the Canadian diaspora as ‘mission 
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invisible’. Given that Canada does not 
collect official statistics about its overseas 
population, Zhang’s project represented a 
pioneering first attempt to quantify the scale 
and geography of Canadian flight overseas. 
Zhang estimated the Canadian diaspora to be 
circa 2.7 million in number, representing 
approximately 8.3 per cent of the national 
population (Zhang 2006, 2007a). This meant 
that on a per capita basis Canadians were 
twice as likely as Australian citizens, three 
times more likely than United States citizens 
and four times more likely than citizens of 
India, to move beyond their country of 
origin.  According to Zhang’s early work, 
circa 1.2 million Canadians dwelled in the 
United States, 270,000 were resident in 
Hong Kong and 378,000 in the rest of Asia, 
486,000 now lived in Europe, and 378,000 
were distributed across countries in South 
America and Africa and the Caribbean. 
Forty per cent of Canadians in Asia or the 
U.S. (or 720,000 people) were from Ontario; 
30 per cent (circa 550,000) were from 
British Columbia, and; 12 per cent (216,000) 
were from Quebec (Zhang 2006). Moreover 
Zhang’s data suggests that whilst 65% of out 
migrants were Canadian by birth 35% were 
foreign born, of which 29% gained Canadian 
citizenship through immigration and 
naturalization (Zhang 2007a). 
DeVoretz (2009a) has since consolidated 
and built upon Zhang’s work to yield further 
estimates of the scale and profiles of the 
character of the Canadian expatriate 
community. DeVoretz’s methodology was 
based upon drawing inferences from a) 
population changes between census which 
cannot be accounted for on the bases of 
fertility and mortality, b) longitudinal 
administrative data sets tracking population 
changes within specific population 
groupings, and c) census and administrative 
date sets held in known and suspected 
countries of destination.   Confirming the 
accuracy of Zhang’s estimate, DeVoretz 
concluded that approximately 2.8 million 
Canadian Citizens currently live abroad. In 
addition, DeVoretz’s (2009a) work 
demonstrated that 57% of Canadians living 
abroad were located in descending order in 
the United States (1.1 million), Greater 
China (292,000), the United Kingdom 
(70,000) and Australia (27,289). With 
specific respect to the outmigration of 
foreign born Canadian citizens DeVoretz 
suggests that Canada’s immigrant 
population has a higher net exit rate (4.5% 
of the population) than its Canadian born 
population (1.3%), that migrants from 
Taiwan (30%), Hong Kong (24%), Japan 
(13%), Singapore (12%), and the United 
States (11%) have the highest net exit rates, 
and that even second generation South Asian 
and Chinese-Canadian citizens have exit 
rates of 9.9% and 11.0% respectively. 
In seeking to better understand the attitudes 
and views of Canadians abroad, in 2007 the 
Asia Pacific Foundation undertook a survey 
with 549 expatriates in Asia and the United 
States. This survey explored expatriates 
socio-economic profile, reasons for 
migrating, expected duration of relocation, 
citizenship status and attachments to 
Canada, ties to Canada, and views on such 
matters as dual citizenship, voting rights, 
taxes, and government services. Perhaps the 
most interesting findings were that 95% of 
respondents had post secondary education, 
over 56% had lived outside of Canada for 
over five years, 64% continued to call 
Canada home, 65% had left Canada for 
career opportunities, 73% supported the idea 
of establishing a Federal agency for 
overseas Canadians, and 69% planned to 
return to Canada and establish permanent 
residency there (Zhang 2007b).  
In 2010 the Asian Pacific Foundation 
undertook a national poll (sample size 2093) 
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within Canada itself in an effort to better 
comprehend Canadian views towards 
Canadian’s living overseas. A significant 
majority of the sample (73%) agreed that 
Canada would benefit from a central agency 
to oversee relations with Canadians abroad; 
66% agreed that children of Canadians born 
overseas should have the same citizenship 
rights as children of Canadians born in 
Canada; 63% of Canadians agreed that 
Canada should continue to promote a dual 
citizenship policy, but only 51% of 
participants were in support of the idea that 
Canadian citizens living abroad should have 
the same voting rights as Canadian citizens 
living in Canada (Zhang 2010a).  
In addition the Asia Pacific Foundation has 
compiled a series of ‘portrait reports’ on 
Canadian expatriate communities in the 
United States (estimated 1.1 million), India 
(estimated 1,530), Singapore (estimated 
5000), South Korea (estimated 15,000), 
United Kingdom (estimated 72,000), Hong 
Kong (estimated 250,000), Beijing 
(estimated 20,000), China’s Xiamen and 
Guangzhou province (estimated 577,000), 
Shanghai (estimated 6,121), Vietnam 
(estimated 1,500), and Trinidad and Tobago 
(estimated 5,000). More specifically 
DeVoretz and Battisi (2009) have provided a 
comparative analyses of the socio-economic 
status of Canadian emigrants in the United 
States and Hong Kong, whilst Zhang 
(2010a) has profiled migration to and from 
Canada and China, and has considered 
further flows of tourists, students, and non 
resident workers between both countries.   
Canada of course already enjoys a 
substantial and dense set of relations with its 
overseas communities. Arguably in the 
Canadian case, to date the mapping of these 
relations has tended to be focussed upon 
Canadian expatriate groups in the United 
States. This would include but would not be 
limited to: 
 C100 - a non-profit, member-driven 
organization dedicated to supporting 
Canadian technology entrepreneur-
ship and investment through 
partnerships among Canadians in 
Silicon Valley.   
 Canadians Abroad - a non-profit, 
volunteer, social and cultural 
organization and social networking 
vehicle for Canadians living in the 
Greater Los Angeles area.    
 All-Canada University Alumni 
Association - an alumni network for 
all graduates from any Canadian 
University which through pooling 
resources is able to organise alumni 
events across the world.   
 The Canadian Expat Association - a 
non-profit, non-government lobby, 
social and cultural, and business 
organisation, linking all Canadians 
living abroad under one bilingual 
platform  
 Connect2Canada - a government run 
social networking site designed to 
promote ongoing interaction and 
networking between Canadians 
living in the United States and 
Canada. 
 The Canadian Expat Network (CEN) 
- a privately run online community 
that connects Canadian expatriates 
and informs overseas citizens of the 
latest news from Canada.  
 The Canadian American Business 
Alliance of South Florida – which 
promotes business networking 
among Canadians living in South 
Florida and between South Florida 
and Canada.  
 The Canadian American Chamber of 
Commerce - a network bringing 
together those who share similar 
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interests with the purpose of 
exploring new business 
opportunities.   
 The Canadian Snowbird Association 
- a national not-for-profit 70,000-
member advocacy organization 
dedicated to actively defending and 
improving the rights and privileges 
of traveling Canadians. 
In conducting their work the Asia Pacific 
Foundation of Canada has began the task of 
mapping diasporic groups both within the 
United States and elsewhere in greater 
detail. From this work it is clear that a whole 
range of less well known Canadian business, 
social, cultural, and political organizations 
exists in Asia in particular. Examples 
include the Canadian China Business 
Council, Canadians in China, Canadian Club 
in Hong Kong, Chinese Canadian 
Association in Hong Kong, Indonesia 
Canada Chamber of Commerce, Association 
of Canadian Teachers in Japan, Tokyo 
Canadians hockey club, Canadian 
Association of Malaysia, Canadian Club of 
Phillipines, Canadian Association of 
Singapore, Canadian Society in Taiwan,  
and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce in 
Vietnam. Whilst an important start, more 
work remains to be done if the full range of 
existing organisations are to be identified 
and their functions understood.   
On the bases of their work the Asia Pacific 
Foundation of Canada has called for a public 
debate on the implications of the Canadian 
diaspora for Canada and on the merits of 
designing a formal Canadian diaspora 
strategy. DeVoretz states this case 
particularly cogently when he asserts:   
‘The current approach to policy formulation 
on Canadians abroad alternates between 
crisis management and benign neglect, with 
little or no coordination among the many 
departments that have a role to play. 
Canadians abroad are often seen as a ‘brain 
drain’ for the country, but it is also possible 
to conceive of expatriates as overseas assets 
for Canada, much in way that we have come 
to appreciate the value of Canadian 
companies with a global presence. The 
challenge is to develop a suite of policies 
that embrace Canadians abroad and which 
encourage their attachment to Canada. At 
the same time, prudent public policy 
requires a careful assessment of the fiscal, 
security and diplomatic risks posed by a 
large overseas population. A concerted 
effort to understand the opportunities and 
challenges presented by Canadians abroad, 
and a coordinated approach to policy 
formulation, could turn this underutilized 
asset into a formidable advantage for 
Canada.’ (DeVoretz 2009a) 
In moving towards the formulation and 
design of a diaspora strategy for Canada, 
five questions would appear to be presenting 
themselves as of especial importance.  
a) Why might Canada benefit from a more 
strategic engagement with its overseas 
citizens? 
As the scale, geography, and character of the 
Canadian diaspora have become better 
understood, attention has increasingly been 
given to whether the Canadian Government 
should develop a formal diaspora strategy.  
Should the Canadian state intervene and 
what would the objectives of such 
intervention be? The central proposition 
which has emerged from the Canadians 
Abroad project is that because the overseas 
Canadian community holds important 
strengths, weaknesses, threats and 
opportunities for Canada such a strategy is 
now overdue (Zhang 2007a, 2009a). A 
beginning has been made in the convening 
by the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
A Diaspora Strategy for Canada? Page 12 
 
International Trade (DFAIT) of a working 
group on Global Citizens and the organizing 
in March 2010 of a one-day workshop with 
experts, practitioners and stakeholders from 
DFAIT, other government departments, civil 
society and academia on how global citizens 
might support Canadian foreign policy and 
trade interests internationally.  Attention has 
been given to the merits of developing new 
policies with respect to improving embassy, 
consular and emergency services, engaging 
other diasporas resident in Canada, 
promoting advocacy for Canada on the 
international stage among youth groups, 
students, teachers and alumni, and 
promoting Canadian competitiveness in the 
global economy. It remains to be seen if the 
Global Citizens project will emerge as a 
policy priority for DFAIT and will come to 
any concrete fruition but certainly the seeds 
of a new journey would appear to have been 
sown. 
b) Which institution(s) within Canada 
should be tasked with the responsibility of 
formulating and overseeing a diaspora 
strategy and should a new institution be 
created for this purpose? 
To date, some consideration has been given 
to the importance of fortifying embassy and 
consular services. In Embassy Magazine in 
March 2010 DeVoretz and Parasaram go 
further and consider the case for instituting a 
new Ministry of Canadians Abroad 
(DeVoretz and Parasaram 2010). They point 
to the challenges Canada faced in 
responding to the need for hasty evacuation 
from war zones in Lebanon and Sri Lanka, 
providing aid for earthquake survivors in 
Pakistan and Haiti, addressing the panic 
which surrounded the finding of the SARS 
virus among Canadians returning from 
Hong-Kong, and dealing with a Canadian 
citizen reporter murdered in Iran and a 
Canadian dissident jailed in China. These 
challenges produced a series of discrete and 
short-term policies based upon the principal 
of crises management. A more strategic and 
long-term approach might have helped 
define the limits and possibilities of 
Canadian Government support for its 
overseas citizens.   DeVoretz and Parasaram 
support the concept of introducing a 
coherent and transparent triage approach. To 
oversee this approach they argue that a 
formal Ministry of Canadians Abroad might 
prove a useful innovation and contend that at 
a minimum, there needs to be a 
centralization of responsibility for Canada’s 
overseas population within a lead ministry. 
c) Should and can the Canadian 
government play an enhanced role in 
building the Canadianess of the Canadian 
diaspora and work to harness the Canadian 
diaspora as a resource in the formulation 
of Canadian foreign policy and diplomacy? 
Because it has emerged as a relatively new 
nation, because it has grown as a nation of 
immigrants, and because it lacks a popular 
history of trauma and victimhood, arguably 
Canada has a relatively weak national 
identity; marked perhaps by its 
comparatively low key celebration of 
Canada Day. Canadian national identity is 
also complicated, defined in part by the 
country’s indigenous roots, its British and 
European legacy, its support for multi-
cultural and tolerant values, and its otherness 
from the United States (Harder 2010). The 
Canadian diaspora in no sense is an 
exemplar of a classic victim diaspora and 
fostering a sense of ethnic nationalism or 
ethnic Canadianness in the diaspora is not 
appropriate or particularly relevant. But this 
does not mean that building the Canadian 
diaspora is not possible or important, that 
Canada’s overseas communities cannot bear 
witness to and promote Canadian values and 
aspirations around the world, and that the 
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Canadian diaspora cannot work to effect 
international diplomacy and enhance 
Canadian foreign policy and international 
relations. Waters (2008) has demonstrated 
that in spite of keeping ties with their 
country of origin, many migrants in Canada 
in fact display a high level of local loyalty 
and engage substantially in civic 
participation. Zhang (2009b, 2010c) 
likewise has shown that Canadian’s living 
abroad retain a strong sense of their 
Canadianness and participate transnationally 
in Canadian affairs. In addition Yu (2010) 
has mapped the existence of over 60 
Canadian diasporic media outlets, 53 media 
organizations and 110 alumni publication 
outlets in 12 selected destinations in Asia, 
Europe, North America and the Middle East. 
Abd-El-Aziz et al. (2005) and Carment and 
Bercuson (2008) provide a valuable scoping 
study of what other countries’ diasporas who 
reside in Canada might contribute to the 
fortification of Canada’s role in international 
affairs. Canadianness exists as a complex 
but meaningful cultural identity among 
diasporic communities and decisions might 
usefully be made about how the Canadian 
government might support and nurture 
patriotic good will towards Canada.  
d) How can the Canadian diaspora be 
harnessed so as to improve the 
competitiveness of Canadian business and 
to stimulate Canadian economic 
development? 
When set in international context, there is no 
doubt that the Canadian diaspora is a 
comparatively well-resourced and well- 
endowed diaspora and one which is 
especially ripe to be engaged to promote the 
global competitiveness of the Canadian 
economy: not least in terms of its scale, 
demography, geography, and skill 
composition.  DeVoretz (2009b) has 
demonstrated that the Canadian diaspora is 
comparatively large in proportion to national 
population when compared with other global 
competitors; is comparatively young and 
skilled; has its most significant presence in 
the two leading economies of the present 
century (the United States and China), and is 
sourced principally from Ontario, British 
Columbia, and Quebec Provinces, which 
include the financial, business, cultural, and 
political muscle and might of Toronto, 
Vancouver, Montreal, and Ottawa. The 
conditions seem right, both in the diaspora 
and within Canada, for a Canadian diaspora 
strategy to be particularly effective in 
brokering Canadian participation in the 
global economy. Not surprisingly, an 
explicit and core pillar of the Global 
Citizens project is to cultivate the Canadian 
diaspora to further Canada’s Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) objectives. Zhang (2010b) 
points to the potential business, tourism, and 
educational benefits which flow from China 
to Canada and which are lubricated by 
Chinese Canadians. Lin, Guan, and 
Nicholson (2008) identify a subset of the 
Chinese community in Canada, International 
Educated Professionals (IED), who have 
developed a niche as transnational 
entrepreneurs and who accomplish 
important work in improving technological 
innovation in Canadian companies. Zweig 
(2008) meanwhile has argued that Canada 
could do more to engage and harness the 
long term business opportunities presented 
by Chinese students studying in Canadian 
universities.  
e) What challenges does the Canadian 
diaspora present to Canadian citizenship 
policy and how should Canadian 
approaches to citizenship respond? 
Canada’s recent interest in rethinking its 
rules on citizenship stem from the fact that it 
is a country with a strong history of 
immigration, where a very particular subset 
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of and minority of the immigrant population 
arrives, becomes naturalised and re-
emigrates (DeVoretz 2009a, Nyers 2010).  
Among some constituencies, there would 
appear to be concern that Canadian 
citizenship is being appropriated by migrants 
for strategic reasons and that Canada is 
being treated as something of a migrant 
hotel. But a much wider set of questions 
demand attention. According to Zhang 
(2010c) Canada’s approach to citizenship 
might be serving to discourage its overseas 
population from engaging with Canada 
rather than encouraging the formation of 
new relationships. Zhang’s focus is upon a) 
the withdrawal of the right of Canadians to 
vote in Canada after they have lived 
overseas for five years (affecting an 
estimated 1.4 million people); b) the role of 
Canada’s tax system in discouraging 
internationally mobile Canadians to retain 
ties with Canada, and; c) amendments to 
citizenship law (B-37) which were 
introduced in Canada in 2009 following the 
‘lost Canadians debate’ which restrict 
intergenerational transfer of Canadian 
citizenship by descent to citizens who live 
overseas. Parasram (2010) meanwhile has 
‘plumbed’ Canadian citizenship policy to 
reveal eight challenges (residency 
requirements, under appreciation of non 
government work abroad,  statelessness, 
gender and motherhood, attachment, plural 
citizenship, equity, and security) which are 
elevated and complicated by overseas 
Canadian populations. Meanwhile Macklin 
and Crépeau (2010) also show that Canada 
already offers a reduced franchise to 
Canadians abroad when compared with 
other countries and that in any event access 
to public health care, social services, and 
education is mediated principally by 
provincial residence and not citizenship 
status. The critical question remains an open 
question therefore: what kinds of citizenship 
rights and responsibilities does and should 
Canada bestow on its expatriate 
communities and why? 
As Canada deliberates over whether or not 
to develop a formal and systematic diaspora, 
strategy finding answers to these five 
questions will assume ever greater 
importance. But importantly these questions 
are ones that have vexed other governments 
who have already trodden this same path. 
Whilst undoubtedly each country will be 
required to find their own way it is prudent 
that the Canadian government reviews the 
decisions and choices which have been 
made elsewhere and ruminates over the 
lessons, if any, which might be gleaned. In 
the remainder of this report we present a 
summary overview of the experience of 
other countries who have chosen to pioneer 
diaspora strategies and consider the potential 
implications of international practice for 
Canada.    
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3. THE RATIONALE FOR 
DEVELOPING A DIASPORA 
STRATEGY   
Why at this historical moment are a growing 
number of sending countries seeking to 
develop explicit and systematic strategies 
aimed at creating, managing and energizing 
relationships with their diasporic 
populations?  Three overarching reasons 
present themselves. Firstly, whilst 
historically diasporic groups have played a 
significant role in nation and state building 
projects in the homeland and historically 
nations and states have looked to diasporic 
groups to promote their interests overseas, 
the twenty first century is witnessing a new 
wave of nation and state building, and as a 
corollary a fresh and novel impetus for new 
migrant contributions to and on behalf of 
political, social and cultural causes in the 
homeland. Indeed within some countries 
there is now emerging a rethinking of the 
nation state as at once, a) a territorially 
bounded community and; b) a globally 
networked community. Secondly, whilst 
emigration was once viewed as an 
indictment of the failure of development 
policy (the so-called brain drain), overseas 
migrant communities are now being re-
appropriated as a potential catalyst for 
economic expansion and the securing of 
global competitive advantage.  Levering and 
harnessing the resources, contacts, 
knowledge, and talents of migrants from 
overseas locations, rather than simply 
seeking to encourage return migration, is 
now being viewed as a desirable policy 
approach. Finally growing international 
migration is challenging the models of 
citizenship adopted in many sending states, 
leading to a revisiting and clarification of 
emigrants’ entitlements and obligations and 
in some cases to the introduction of entirely 
fresh categories of citizenship. Albeit 
tempered by fears of geopolitical instability 
and security concerns, yet ever more states 
are permitting forms of dual and even 
multiple citizenship.   
The population of Ireland is circa 4.4 
million. There are 800,000 Irish born people 
living overseas and 3.1 million Irish Citizens 
(passport holders) dwelling overseas (the 
majority in both cases in the United 
Kingdom). More broadly, there are an 
estimated 70 to 80 million people who claim 
Irish ancestry, mainly in the United 
Kingdom, USA, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, and Argentina. The history of 
Anglo-Irish relations, the Great Irish Famine 
in the 1940s and the representation of the 
Irish diaspora as a victim diaspora have 
conspired to create an elevated patriotism 
among Irish communities abroad. The Irish 
diaspora has changed the course of Irish 
history through remittance payments and 
political mobilization in support of 
nationalist movements.   In 2002, in the 
midst of the buoyant Celtic Tiger economic 
boom, Ireland commissioned a Task Force 
on Policies Towards Emigration which 
recommended using the country’s new 
found wealth to extend welfare assistance to 
overseas populations, especially vulnerable 
groups (the elderly, infirm, sick, the poor 
and prisoners) who left Ireland in the 1950s 
and the 1980s to move to British cities.  
Recently, Ireland’s policy towards its 
diaspora has been equally motivated by two 
further considerations. Firstly, there is 
growing concern that the strength of 
diasporic attachment and affiliation to 
Ireland might be waning (ironically not least 
because of peace in Northern Ireland) and 
that a certain level of disenchantment exists. 
The Irishness of the Irish diaspora can no 
longer be taken for granted. As a 
consequence, priority is now being given to 
the nurturing of the social and cultural life of 
the diaspora and its continued enthusiasm 
for matters Irish (Ancien, Boyle and Kitchin 
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2009a). Secondly, given the dramatic 
collapse of the Irish economy, banking 
system, and property sector from 2007, there 
is growing recognition that diasporic 
networks have a role to play in brokering the 
country’s economic revival. The Irish 
diaspora is one tool to be harnessed to 
rescue a country which is quite literally 
bankrupt.  
The population of New Zealand is 4.3 
million. Circa 750,000 New Zealanders live 
outside New Zealand. Although present in 
178 countries, the New Zealand diaspora 
dwells principally in Australia, with the UK, 
Canada, and the USA being of lesser 
importance. New Zealand’s diaspora 
strategy arose in recognition of the 
geographical isolation and peripherality of 
New Zealand and the importance of 
harnessing expatriates to connect to the 
global economy. The strategy seeks to 
promote the idea that New Zealand is at 
once a nation state in the remote Southern 
hemisphere and a globally networked 
community and as such New Zealand is 
pioneering the concept that the nation state 
can be territorially bounded on the one 
handed but deterritorialised and globally 
connected on the other.  The New Zealand 
diaspora strategy seeks to connect New 
Zealand and its diaspora to improve global 
economic competitiveness, lever investment, 
circulate and embed technology and 
knowledge, promote the New Zealand 
brand, and foster return migration.    
The population of Scotland is 5.15 million. 
Overseas Scots total circa 1.27 million, two 
thirds of whom dwell in England. A wider 
ancestral diaspora is estimated to be circa 
28-40 million and based mainly in the USA, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
Although Scotland now has its own 
Government, it remains a constituent part of 
the United Kingdom and only enjoys a 
limited number of devolved powers.  
Scotland’s turn to its diaspora stems from 
debates in the early 2000s about impending 
skill shortages. At the time it was believed 
that the Scottish population was in decline 
and that Scotland’s population could dip 
below five million and fortifying positive 
net migration (including courting returning 
diasporeans) was the preferred policy 
option.  From this point of departure, three 
additional progenitors of the Scottish 
diaspora strategy have emerged. Firstly, 
there remains a belief that population growth 
will be an important stimulus to the 
economic development of Scotland and 
Scotland has set itself the target of matching 
the average European EU (EU15) population 
growth over the period from 2007 to 2017.  
Secondly, in so far as diasporic populations 
can help Scottish businesses compete in the 
world market and help broker transnational 
capital investment into Scotland, it is 
believed that the diaspora can help the 
Scottish economy to become ‘smarter’ and 
‘wealthier’. Finally, with the Scottish 
National Party now presiding over the 
devolved Scottish Government, the Scottish 
diaspora is seen as integral to the building of 
a new species of Scottish civic nationalism.  
Whilst emigration from Armenia has been a 
constant feature of its history, the main 
waves of large-scale, systematic and forced 
emigration were 1894-1896, 1915-22, and 
1988 to the present.  The consequence is a 
sizeable and classical victim diaspora of 
some six million plus located in five 
predominant geographic locations – former 
Soviet states (e.g., Russia 2,250,000; 
Georgia 460,000; Ukraine, 150,000); North 
America predominately concentrated in the 
United States (1,400,000); Europe, with by 
far the largest concentration in France 
(450,000); the Middle East (with large 
groupings in Lebanon, 234,000 and Syria, 
150,000); and South America with a large 
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group in Argentina (130,000). Undoubtedly 
Armenia struggled with its transition from a 
socialist satellite state to an independent 
republic after independence in 1992 and at 
least according to some viewpoints within 
Armenia relations with the diaspora were 
more a hinderance than a help. The first post 
independence Armenian President Ter-
Petrossian provoked the ire of the diaspora 
by adopting a strategic and pragmatic 
relationship with historical foes  Turkey and 
Azerbaijan.  Petrossian recognised the 
resources of the diaspora to be a vast asset 
but considered its brand of ideological 
foreign policy to be a liability. The election 
of President Kocharyan in 1998 announced a 
new departure. Kocharyan adopted a foreign 
policy which was more nationalistic and in 
tune with the aspirations of the diaspora. In 
return he sought and secured support from 
the diaspora. Walking the typerope between 
securing domestic autonomy and sourcing 
overseas assistance proved to be a challenge 
but one which generated benefits. More 
recently President Sargsyan, who was 
elected in 2008, has continued to court the 
diaspora aggressively and in his program for 
government published in 2007 gave a 
commitment to prioritize the development 
and implementation of a ‘conceptual 
framework’ for Amernia diaspora relations, 
a comprehensive ‘consolidation of diaspora 
policies’ and the establishment of a 
‘dedicated diaspora agency’.  
The population of China is circa 1.4 billion. 
The population of overseas Chinese is circa 
42 million, 80% of whom live in South East 
Asia, with North America, Europe and 
Australia being of progressively lesser 
importance. Since the People’s Communist 
Party came to power in 1949 China 
(People’s Republic of China or PRC) has 
sought to reach out to overseas Chinese 
citizens, even when at times they viewed 
these citizens with a certain suspicion – 
especially during the isolationist periods 
when Mao Tse Tung held power. Article 98 
of the PRC’s 1954 Constitution guarantees 
the legal protection and rights of overseas 
citizens and allows for their formal 
participation in the National People’s 
Congress. Under the comparatively more 
moderate Den Xiaoping, the PRC’s 
perspective on the Chinese diaspora was 
nevertheless dramatically transformed. From 
the 1980s onwards, and certainly following 
the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, the 
PRC has actively courted the Chinese 
diaspora with a view to brokering a 
progressive relationship between China and 
the world, and in particular to promote 
international diplomacy, knowledge transfer, 
trade and investment.   
The population of India is 1.2 billion.  The 
population of the Indian diaspora is circa 25 
million, broadly spread and present in 110 
countries. The diaspora formed in four 
waves of migration: indentured labour 
migration, post independence (1947) 
migrations, the Middle Eastern oil boom 
migration, and the more recent movement of 
knowledge workers to Silicon Valley in 
California. India’s turn to its diaspora was 
stimulated by a government commissioned 
report undertaken by an influential High 
Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora in 
2001. With the country standing at the 
threshold of emerging as a global economic 
power, the strategy was motivated by a 
concern to harness the economic potential of 
the global Indian diaspora. But the strategy 
was also stimulated by a desire to further 
develop and broadcast India’s confident 
postcolonial identity to the world, using the 
diaspora to parade its technological prowess, 
brand of tolerant ecumenical Hinduism, and 
progressive attitudes to multiculturalism 
(diasporeans are encouraged to be loyal to 
their new homes first and foremost).  
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Interest in engaging diasporic populations 
then normally originates in trigger events 
which arise in one of three policy fields; 
nation and state building, improving global 
economic competitiveness, and developing 
new approaches to defining and servicing 
national citizenship. For Ireland, diaspora 
strategy was initially conceived as an 
opportunity to spend the fiscal surpluses of 
the Celtic Tiger boom on the protection and 
welfare of vulnerable and forgotten overseas 
migrants; for Israel, motivation derives 
principally from the desire to protect and 
defend the right of the state of Israel to exist; 
for Scotland, concern initially was with low 
fertility levels and the social, economic, 
political, and cultural consequences of a 
shrinking population; for New Zealand, the 
diaspora is seen as a means of countering 
geographical isolation from the global 
economy; for Armenia, the diaspora is being 
seen as a resource in the reassertion and 
reclamation of a post-Soviet national 
identity and trajectory; for India and China, 
diasporic groups are being deployed to 
broker integration into the global economy 
at a moment when the global distribution of 
power is being realigned; whilst for Mexico, 
the efficient harnessing of diasporic 
remittances is being promoted to counter the 
effects of population flight from the global 
south. It is common for diaspora strategies 
to broaden out from their point of origin and 
to populate all three policy fields. Quite how 
the point of departure (the specific policy 
field and particular triggers) of any diaspora 
strategy enables and constrains the 
subsequent rolling out of this strategy 
remains to be understood.    
 
a) Why might Canada benefit from a more strategic engagement with its overseas citizens? 
 
It is clear that Canada has stakes in its diaspora with respect to the three progenitors of diaspora 
strategy identified above; in promoting national economic development, in redefining citizenship 
law and entitlements, and in promoting Canadian social, cultural, and political values and interests 
globally. But Canada has a unique point of entry to the global diaspora strategy debate too. From 
our vista, Canada’s role as a global immigrant magnet and leading proponent of muti-culturalism, 
and  the important subset of Canadian’s abroad who are naturalised Canadians, provides the 
country with a fundamentally unique resource which, if harnessed properly, could define its 
diaspora strategy and brand it as globally innovative.  In the introduction to this report we insisted 
that far from being a neutral bystander, definitions of diaspora condition the kinds of diaspora 
strategies that are capable of being imagined and enacted. In the DFAIT concept of the global 
citizen Canada has an opportunity to contribute original thinking to the global dialogue on diaspora 
strategy. The concept of the global citizen, incorporating as it does all constituencies in Canada 
with resources which might help the country enhance its global activities and relations (including 
other countries’ diaspora in Canada, whether naturalised or not, Canadian minded populations 
overseas whether Canadian citizens or not and whether naturalised or Canadian born) significantly 
broadens the populations which diaspora strategies might conceivable engage with. The concept of 
the global citizen needs to be developed, sharpened and operationalised but it does present an 
internationally unique and  politically progressive point of departure and provides Canada with an 
opportunity to contribute to as well as to draw from global dialogue in international best practice. 
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4. THE INSTITUTIONS AND 
STRATEGIC APPROACHES 
THROUGH WHICH COUNTRIES 
SEEK TO ENGAGE THEIR 
DIASPORAS  
Whilst it is relatively easy to identify 
branches of state which deal with 
immigration, it is more difficult to establish 
who governs over matters of emigration. 
Cognate state departments and 
administrative units such as Departments of 
Foreign Affairs, Departments of Home 
Affairs, Departments of Heritage and 
Culture, and Enterprise and Development 
Agencies, devise and implement solutions to 
emigration problems normally in an ad hoc 
and isolated way. Gamlen (2008) develops 
the useful notion of the ‘emigrant state’ to 
capture the totality of the work these range 
of state actors perform. Diaspora strategies 
emerge when particular states decide it is 
necessary to firstly secure an overview of 
the range of actually existing public, private, 
and voluntary diasporic ties (to map the 
existing range of transnational connections) 
and secondly to articulate and enact a 
preferred orientation as to how these ties 
might best be developed. A diaspora 
strategy, it should be noted, does not 
necessarily demand the development of a 
coherent and formalized top-down, 
bureaucratically regulated, centralized and 
managerialist, blueprint. But it does imply a 
strategic understanding of the full extent of 
the emigrant state and the ways in which the 
emigrant state might be better deployed. 
There exists a continuum of institutional 
innovation.  Some states are content to map 
their emigrant state apparatus, to promote 
joined-up thinking and to leave each state 
department and administrative unit to its 
own devices.  Other states provide 
protection for particular diaspora initiatives 
proposed by their various state departments 
and administrative units and police and 
regulate these infant strategies. More 
involved, yet other governments encourage 
and induce their various departments and 
administrative units to bring forth particular 
diaspora policies. A higher level of 
engagement comes when a state teaches, 
cultivates, nurtures, and re-energizes state 
departments and administrative units who 
are already pursuing particular diaspora 
engagements. Finally, more muscular states 
again further embark on a formal strategy of 
actively governing over their emigrant state, 
dedicating whole ministries, sections of state 
departments, or special purpose 
administrative units to the task of 
developing and implementing coherent 
diaspora strategies.  
It is obvious why many governments might 
want to engage their diaspora, but why 
should state bodies intervene at all? What is 
the justification for state intervention and 
when might such intervention be 
productive? This is a question which has 
generated particular scrutiny in the Scottish 
case. According Rutherford (2009), 
intervention is particularly valuable when 
three particular types of ‘market failure’ 
occur: network effects, transaction 
costs/information failure, and externalities. 
Firstly, market failure occurs when projects 
are judged to be sufficiently risky or 
unproven to be tackled. Intervention to build 
diasporic networks can be justified if the 
cost of network establishment proves to be a 
disincentive for early adopters, and when 
networks only become viable when more 
established and mature. Governments can 
internalise the costs of network creation and 
shepherd these networks until they reach the 
critical size necessary to demonstrate their 
sustainability. Secondly, market failure can 
occur if transaction costs and the cost of 
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researching and gaining knowledge of 
opportunities are high. Governments can 
work to produce and share information and 
services to bring these costs down beneath 
the level at which they prove to be a 
disincentive.  Finally, market failure on 
account of positive externalities occurs when 
projects produce both private and public 
goods, but where the profitability of the 
private good is not sufficient to encourage 
the private actor to initiate the project.   
Governments can invest where the aggregate 
good includes, but is larger than, benefits to 
private citizens.  
State interventions can be represented in the 
continuum; absent, custodian, midwife, 
husbandry, and demiurge: 
 Absent - the state leaves the 
formation of links between the 
homeland and the diaspora to the 
market or to autonomous social, 
cultural and political movements, 
with the diaspora self-organizing its 
engagement with its homeland.  
 Custodian - the state nurtures, 
protects, regulates, and polices new 
and emerging diasporic connections.  
 Midwifery - the state identifies 
potential engagements, champions/ 
leaders and mobilizes and cultivates 
them but leaves ownership of 
initiatives in the hands of the 
diaspora.  
 Husbandry - the state works with and 
re-energizes existing diaspora 
organisations and networks.  
 Demiurge - the state directly creates 
and runs diasporic initiatives and 
networks, perhaps with the intention 
of letting the market assume 
responsibility at a later date. 
Within Ireland, The Irish Abroad Unit, a 
division within the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, seeks to promote joined-up thinking 
and coordination across branches of the state 
for instance with respect to the diasporic 
relevant work of Enterprise Ireland, the 
Industrial Development Agency, The 
President’s Office, and other departments 
within the state.  With respect to the policies 
of these agencies, the motif of the Irish state 
is ‘let a thousand flowers bloom’, with the 
state at best ‘lightly incubating’ existing 
initiatives or seeding new initiatives. The 
Irish schemes are slowly transferring to 
more managerialist interventions, especially 
with regards to accountability and 
transparency of spending, but there remains 
an underlying inclination to leave diaspora 
organizations and networks to run 
themselves, providing only minimal 
resources (basic funding, advice, speakers, 
etc) and only when an organization or 
network needs to be re-energized and 
requires the short-term backing of the Irish 
state. 
A key weakness of the Armenian state in the 
years immediately following independence 
from the Soviet Union was the lack of 
capacity within the state apparatus. 
Accordingly, across the past decade there 
has emerged a concerted effort to build the 
Armenian state and undoubtedly the 
institutional capacity of the current state 
represents a momentous improvement on 
what the country inherited from the Soviet 
period. The limit of Armenia’s weak 
institutional capacity is especially evident 
when one considers the capacity of the 
Armenian state to engage, lever, and harness 
diasporic resources and expertise.   Part of 
the challenge of developing a diaspora 
strategy then has been the creation of 
institutional capacity and structures within 
Armenia capable of extending existing ties 
and establishing new relationships with the 
diaspora. Initially this engagement was 
largely the preserve of the Ministry of 
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Foreign Affairs and to an extent, the 
Ministry for Economy.  More recently in 
2008 a new Ministry of Diaspora was 
established. This Ministry represents a 
dramatic development in state building in 
the sphere of diaspora engagement; a 
significant ramping up of what Armenia is 
capable of doing with its diaspora.   
India has a well-developed diaspora strategy 
which is produced and managed by a 
dedicated Ministry of Overseas Indian 
Affairs (MOIA), which came into existence 
in May 2004 as the Ministry of Non-
Resident Indians’ Affairs. Within the 
terminology of the Indian state, this Ministry 
has the status of a ‘Services’ Ministry. The 
Ministry is primarily responsible for all 
issues relevant to Overseas Indians, 
comprising Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) 
and Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) which are 
not specifically allocated to other 
Ministries/Departments of the Government 
of India. Like Armenia, India has found it 
useful to erect a powerful and central state 
organ to oversee its ties with its diaspora and 
more specifically has adopted a highly 
interventionist posture, setting up schemes 
and managing programmes directly from 
New Delhi. 
The Scottish Government’s International 
Projects Division – instituted by and guided 
by its International Framework published in 
2008 –  seeks to promote joined up thinking 
and coordination across branches of the 
state, for instance with respect to the 
diasporic relevant work of  Scottish 
Enterprise, Scottish Development 
International, and VisitScotland.  In 2009 
the Scottish Government hosted a Scottish 
Diaspora Forum in which invited thought 
leaders were asked to propose bold new 
initiatives to better engage the Scottish 
Diaspora. In 2010 it published a well 
thought out plan and list of priorities. Whilst 
the International Projects Division performs 
more as nimble and flexible coordinator than 
as a key actor itself, and seeks to bring a 
range of agencies behind the plan, the 
specific Scottish schemes tend to be highly 
managerialist in nature.  Whilst important 
exceptions exist, in the Scottish case, the 
state functions largely as the lead player in 
proposing, managing, and reviewing 
schemes. Indeed Scotland identifies itself as 
Europe’s leading pioneer in the development 
of formal and systematic state led diaspora 
strategies. 
New Zealand’s diaspora strategy is co-
ordinated and managed by Kea New 
Zealand, a non-for-profit organization which 
works in close relation with, but which 
exists independently from, government.  
Whilst the New Zealand state anticipates 
that as the strategy matures Kea will knit 
together with other expatriate initiatives 
(devised by other Ministries and 
Departments including, for example, the 
New Zealand Treasuries alumni networks 
scheme), to date Kea continues to dominate 
the field and is the lead player. As such, the 
New Zealand state operates with a light 
touch and has externalized diaspora 
strategizing. Kea was conceived and 
launched at the Knowledge Wave 
Conference in Auckland in August 2001. 
Initially funded through private 
philanthropy, it is now funded in descending 
order by the Government (Ministry of 
Economic Development and New Zealand 
Trade and Enterprise), the private sector, 
sponsorship, service fees, and membership 
fees (both corporate and individual). It has 
four full-time regional managers in the UK 
(London), Australia (Sydney), North 
America (New York), and China (Shanghai), 
and fourteen international chapters: Los 
Angeles, San Francisco, New York, Boston, 
London, Manchester, Paris, Amsterdam, 
A Diaspora Strategy for Canada? Page 22 
 
Dubai, Shanghai, Sydney, Melbourne, 
Brisbane, Vancouver. 
China’s approach to its diaspora is being 
championed by the State Council’s General 
Office of Overseas Chinese affairs, the 
Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress, and the Political 
Consultation Conference. Within the 
Communist Party the Department of the 
Unification Front assumes primary 
responsibility. Whilst these various 
institutions promote dialogue with respect to 
how best to engage and cater for the 
overseas Chinese community, there exists no 
formal overarching diaspora strategy. 
Undoubtedly the objective of the Chinese 
authorities is to secure the loyalty of the 
overseas Chinese and to engender a 
sympathetic pro-Beijing, pro-socialist, but 
still modern and technologically aware 
diaspora.  In spite of its centralist reputation, 
much of what the Chinese state does is 
mainly designed to support initiatives led by 
diasporic communities and to provide a 
macro-economic regulatory framework 
which incentivizes diasporic engagement. 
Whilst ultimately controlled by the Chinese 
Communist Party, the Chinese diaspora 
strategy is still surprisingly light touch. 
 
b) Which institution(s) within Canada should be tasked with the responsibility of formulating 
and overseeing a diaspora strategy and should a new institution be created for this purpose? 
 
International practice suggests that countries who are seeking to fortify and develop their 
relations with diasporic communities are viewing it as necessary to erect new institutional 
capacities to accomplish this task. Among the models of governance which are emerging are 
the creation of dedicated new Ministries, the establishment of diaspora units within 
Government departments, the establishment of nimble and flexible cross department working 
groups, and the outsourcing of diaspora strategy to voluntary and/or private sector groups. As a 
first step it would seem imperative that Canada maps its ‘emigrant state’ and reflects upon the 
fitness of purpose of its emigrant state. Moreover some diaspora strategies fail because 
governments seek to impose a fresh blueprint and set of structures on an already crowded 
landscape of organic transnational relations, without mapping these prior ties or working 
collaboratively with and alongside them. It would seem important that Canada fully 
understands its existing connections with its overseas communities. In our experience, 
governments are often unaware, and on occasions surprised and taken aback, with what exists 
already and what can be put offside and suffocated by new top down bureaucratic strategies. 
Critical market failures do occur and there is a role for states to intervene and sometimes to 
intervene in a muscular way. But the skill in formulating diaspora strategies pivots around 
strategic and timely state interventions. Whatever institution is given responsibility for 
formulating and overseeing a diaspora strategy for Canada, it is crucial that attention is given to 
the particular spaces in which any intervention might work and how intervention might work 
with and build upon actually existing transnational ties.   
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5. DIASPORA AND NATION 
BUILDING  
Historically, diasporic communities have 
played an active and at times key role in the 
rise and fall of cultural and political 
nationalisms and nationalist movements in 
the homeland. This support has taken the 
form of leadership and organization, 
volunteering, moral and political solidarity, 
fundraising for political parties, the 
provision of armaments and explosives, and 
the dissemination of political propaganda. 
This is especially true of victim diaspora or 
diaspora whose history is fraught with the 
trauma of a natural or human disaster 
(earthquake, tsunami, hurricane, genocide, 
famine, warfare) and who reside in diaspora 
in exile with seemingly heightened patriotic 
fervour.  Nation building continues to serve 
as an important progenitor of state interest in 
engaging diasporic communities. According 
to Lainer-Vos (2010) at a more substantial 
level building the nation has come to imply 
a simultaneous building of the nation at 
home and in diaspora.  Here, renewed 
interest has been given to ‘recharging’ short 
term return visits, social and cultural 
activities, honours and awards systems, and 
communication and ICT links. Whilst this 
move might be read as a recognition that 
diasporic loyalty can no longer be taken for 
granted, a more profound interpretation 
points to a re-conceptualization of 
relationships which have hitherto been 
assumed to exist between nation and 
territory.  
Of course the significance attached by long 
established nations to promoting the virtues 
of their national narrative and their values 
and beliefs within the international 
community continues unabated. But the 
twenty first century is also giving birth to a 
new generation of nation building projects 
which in turn are once again actively 
seeking to enlist diasporic support and to 
harness diasporic patriotism. Firstly, the 
legacy of the European colonial adventure in 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America continues to 
reverberate, in terms of the trials and 
tribulations of still vulnerable fledgling new 
states. Secondly, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union has resulted in, at times, volatile 
ethnic factionalism and in the creation of 
post-Soviet states in central and Eastern 
Europe. Thirdly, recent US foreign policy 
has created or is striving to create nation 
building in, among other places, Afghanistan 
and Iraq. Finally, successionist and 
independence movements continue to assert 
their right to self-determination in places 
such as the Balkans, Scotland, Northern 
Ireland, Quebec, Sri Lanka, and Palestine.  
With respect to (but not confined to) these 
four contexts, the literature on diasporic 
intervention in state building has focused 
upon three central issues. Firstly, there has 
been considerable debate over the extent to 
which diasporas contribute more to conflict 
and political anarchy than to conflict 
resolution and purposeful statecraft (Shain 
and Barth 2003). Brinkerhoff (2009) argues 
that it is no longer possible to view diaspora 
as mere adjuncts to homeland conflicts and 
provides a valuable summary of the 
conditions in which diaspora might serve as 
‘conflict entrepreneurs’, ‘competing 
interests’, or ‘contributors to stability and 
development’. Secondly, an alternative 
debate has focused upon the readiness of 
home states, institutionally and politically, 
to effectively interface with, and be engaged 
by, willing, motivated, and in some cases 
wealthy, diasporic sponsors. Freinkman’s 
(2002) study of the early post-Soviet 
Armenian state provides lessons both for 
willing diaspora groups (that they should 
seek suitable institutional forms before 
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engaging and investing) and home states 
(that without proper institutional 
frameworks much effort can be dissipated 
without effective results). Meanwhile 
Waterbury’s (2005) analyses of the 
appropriation of diaspora strategy by elites 
in post communist Hungary, and Mohan’s 
(2008) study of the Ghanaian government’s 
engagement of its diaspora points to the 
political sensitivities which need to be 
managed if diasporic communities are to be 
drawn into domestic nation building 
projects.  Finally, not only do some states 
and political parties attempt to harness the 
energy of diasporic communities to bolster 
domestic political agendas and programmes, 
but so too diasporic populations are 
frequently enlisted to broker foreign policy, 
influence international relations, promote 
cultural values, and perform diplomatic 
functions, in their roles as advocates, 
activists, agitators and ambassadors of the 
nation. 
A prerequisite for a successful diaspora 
strategy is a motivated diaspora, willing and 
minded to contribute to national 
development. Whilst perhaps historically 
taken for granted, the social and cultural 
condition, empathy, and inclination of 
diasporic communities is now emerging 
itself as an important arena for intervention. 
Diasporic patriotism varies in time and 
space, with the patriotic flame being doused 
and ignited by a variety of origin and 
destination specific triggers. But states can 
play a role in incubating, fostering and 
building diaspora social and cultural 
networks. Arguably, the nation needs to be 
strategically and consciously built in the 
diaspora first if the diaspora is to contribute 
to nation building in the homeland. 
Although at first glance a reasonably 
straightforward proposition, in fact such a 
project might imply and encourage a 
profound shift in the ways in which ‘nations’ 
and ‘territory’ are imagined. For Agnew 
(2005), contemporary interest in building 
nations at home and in diaspora points to a 
preparedness to de-territorialise the nation 
and to cast or re-territorialise the nation as a 
global network. Only a small number of 
countries have begun the task of thinking 
through the implications of this seismic shift 
in thinking about the relations which exist 
between geography, nations, and states. 
Ireland Armenia, Croatia and New Zealand 
are examples.  
Projects designed to fortify and recharge 
national pride for, and patriotism towards, 
the homeland have made use of organized 
short-term visits. These visits are often 
managed and funded by governments and 
include visitations by more youthful cohorts 
for short periods lasting from a week to 
much longer periods. By following a set 
itinerary which includes formal schooling in 
the nations’ history and politics, visiting 
iconic places, participating in social and 
cultural activities including attending and 
celebrating religious festivals, exposure to 
oral history, and access to leading national 
politicians and celebrities, the objective is to 
produce a memorable visit which energize 
future diasporic leaders and which will sow 
the seeds for a lifelong commitment and 
loyalty. Two frequently cited and classic 
exemplars of the workings and effectiveness 
of organized short term visits to the 
homeland are the Taglit-Birthright Israel and 
MASA programmes, which repatriate 
Jewish Youth to Israel. The Know India 
Programme likewise provides diaspora 
youth with a three week internship with a 
view to promoting a new awareness of and 
interest in India. 
Many diaspora groups have established 
homeland specific social, cultural and 
sporting clubs and networks, some 
accompanied with designated physical 
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infrastructure such as theatres, schools, 
museums, sporting arenas, and libraries, and 
governments often support these groups 
through direct and in-kind funding (such as 
supporting cultural visits by politicians, 
celebrities, national icons, sporting heroes, 
artists, writers and performers) as a way of 
maintaining cultural identity.  Ireland, for 
example, funds creative artists to visit the 
diaspora, funds Irish sporting organizations 
overseas, and funds overseas Irish heritage 
resources such as the Kennedy Library in 
Boston.  These supports are increasingly 
forming part of, and being coordinated 
through, national cultural and heritage 
strategies. Countries may also provide 
specific services relating to cultural identity. 
For example, India has set up a state-
sponsored genealogy service ‘Tracing the 
Roots’ which engages a private company 
(Indiroots) to construct a family tree for a 
small fee. The Irish Department of 
Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs 
supports the teaching of the Irish language at 
third-institutions outside of Ireland. 
Similarly, the Lithuanian government funds 
Lithuanian schools to teach the Lithuanian 
language and cultural heritage to the 
descendants of Lithuanian emigrants.  
Some nations also make use of national 
honours and awards systems to build 
diasporic loyalty by recognising the 
contribution of individual diaspora members 
to the homeland and to society in general. Of 
course most nations have an official honours 
system through which normally civilians are 
recognised and rewarded for their 
contributions to the furtherment and 
betterment of the national cause. Some of 
these systems have sought to incorporate 
overseas citizens and more generally 
overseas non-nationals who have also served 
the nation with distinction. The French 
honours system is perhaps the most famous 
example; whilst awards to overseas citizens 
rarely afford such citizens with  membership 
rights and entitlements enjoyed by French 
nationals, France does still regularly reward 
the achievements of such citizens in its 
principal honours: Légion d'honneur (Legion 
of Honour); L'Ordre National du Mérite 
(National Order of Merit); L'Ordre des Arts 
et des Lettres (The Order of Arts and 
Letters); Palmes académiques (Order of the 
Academic Palms); L’Ordre du Mérite 
Agricole (The Order of Agricultural Merit), 
and; L’Ordre du Mérite Maritime (The 
Order of Maritime Merit). More particularly, 
some nations have created an entirely new 
set of honours and awards for their diasporic 
population. For example, since 2003, the 
President of India has presented the Pravasi 
Bharatiya Samman Awards to up to 20 
members of the Indian diaspora; the highest 
civilian honour which can be bestowed on 
overseas citizens. In 2006, KEA New 
Zealand started the World Class New 
Zealand Awards to honour New Zealanders 
making a significant international 
contribution in different spheres.   
Building a sense of nationhood in a diaspora 
also necessitates opening up new dialogue 
with diasporic communities, increasingly 
through the use of ICT technologies. Some 
countries have set up formal arrangements 
of consultation with their diasporas. For 
example, Jamaica has established the 
Jamaican Diaspora Advisory Board. Its 
members are elected and it meets twice a 
year to discuss diaspora matters. In addition, 
a diaspora conference of invited delegates 
meets every two years, with regional 
conferences held in interregnum between the 
biennial Conferences. Similarly, Norway 
(Norgestinget), Finland 
(Ulkosuomalaisparlamentti), Sweden 
(Utlandssvenskarnas parliament), France 
(Assemblée des Français de l’étranger) and 
Switzerland (Organisation des Suisses de 
l’étranger) have recently established 
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expatriate parliaments to consult with their 
diasporas about domestic and diaspora 
matters. India has established the Prime 
Minister’s Global Advisory Council of 
Overseas Indians, and also hosts events to 
meet with its diaspora twice a year, in India 
in January and overseas each September.  
Many countries seek to inform the diaspora 
as to what is happening in their home 
country through newsletters and websites. It 
should be noted that many of these 
initiatives are organic and are led by actors 
from the private and voluntary sector; others 
are state led. Barabanstv (2005) identifies 
more than 30 Chinese newspapers published 
in Europe alone, including the European 
Times (ouzhoushibao) (France), Europe 
Daily (ouzhou ribao) (France), Chinese 
Communicator (huaqiao tongxun) (the 
Netherlands), United Business Paper (lianhe 
shangbao) (Hungary), Romanian Chinese 
(lüluo huaren) (Romania), Chinese New 
Paper (huaxinbao) (Spain), Austrian 
Chinese (auhua) (Austria). Web site portals, 
both state-sponsored (such as 
Connect2Canada) and run by NGOs or 
private organisations or even individuals 
(such as the Canadian Expatriate Network), 
detailing useful information to the diaspora 
in situ and also about the home country, are 
seen by many in the diaspora and those 
seeking to serve the diasporic community as 
vital infrastructure. Some of these portals are 
very broad in nature, often having a social 
networking facility. Increasingly, Facebook, 
Twitter, and LinkedIn, and derivate 
equivalent social networking tools are being 
deployed. In addition, many diaspora can 
also keep in contact with their homeland 
through broadcast media via satellite and 
Internet. Whilst there exist few state-
sponsored free to air channels aimed 
specifically at the diaspora as a constituent 
group, the BBC, SKY, CNN, Bloomberg, 
Euronews, CCTV (China), NDTV24x7 
(India), NHKWorldTV (Japan), Al Jazeera 
(Arab World) all play an important role. 
Meanwhile the Indian government produces 
a monthly e-magazine (overseasindian). 
Likewise the Scottish government produces 
a quarterly e-magazine (ScotlandNow). In 
the Irish case, Emigrant News, an 
independent organisation provides a weekly 
news summary of Irish relevant news.     
Armenia presents a classic example of a 
country which is seeking to refresh its 
national narrative but also to rebuild its 
national story for the twenty first century. 
The building the Armenian nation as a 
globally dispersed cultural and political 
community has emerged as central to the 
work of the new Armenian Ministry for 
diaspora. Indeed arguably to date it has been 
the cultural fortification of Armenianess in 
the diaspora that has been the primary 
objective of the new Armenian Ministry for 
Diasora. At the heart of the strategy has been 
the concept of the ‘Armenian World’. Rather 
than conceiving of Armenia as a small 
landlocked nation in the interior of the 
Caucasus, Armenia is now being imagined 
and invented as a globally networked nation 
which surpasses the boundaries of the state 
of Armenia itself. Armenia is keen to build 
the narratives of the Armenian World with 
due reverence for its history of trauma but 
also with respect to its potential to play a 
new role in the twentieth first century.  In 
important ways the Ministry has been keen 
to help support the self organization of the 
diaspora and to avoid crowding into space 
which the diaspora already occupies and 
services itself.  To gain some insights into 
its work it is worth noting some of the chief 
projects pursued in 2010 were:    
 Development and implementation of 
the ‘Ari Tun’ program (periodic 
visits of Diaspora Armenian youth to 
Armenia)  
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 Development and implementation of 
the ‘One Nation, One Culture’ Pan-
Armenian Cultural Festival  
 Organizing professional forums and 
scientific conferences with Armenian 
themes  
 Coordination and organizing of the 
contest for ‘Best Armenian School’ 
at the annual pan-Armenian award 
ceremony ‘for notable contributions 
to the preservation of Armenian 
identity’  
 Organizing and conducting the ‘Our 
Greats’ program of events to pay 
homage to notable Diaspora 
Armenians 
 Implementation of the Year of the 
Mother Language 
 Organizing to provide public 
educational institutions and 
community organizations of the 
Diaspora with educational, 
children’s, fictional and scientific 
literature and Armenian emblems 
 Implementation of efforts aimed at 
expanding the network of one-day 
schools, the ‘Sister Schools’ program 
 Organizing efforts aimed at 
broadening educational opportunities 
for Diaspora Armenians studying at 
Armenian universities and 
intermediate vocational institutions 
 “Establishment of an ‘Alley of 
Armenian Benefactors’ program 
 Organizing ‘Armenia-Diaspora’ 
theme-based video-conferences and 
teleconferences  
  
 
A Diaspora Strategy for Canada? Page 28 
 
c) Should and can the Canadian government play an enhanced role in building the 
Canadianess of the Canadian diaspora and work to harness the Canadian diasporas a 
resource in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy and diplomacy? 
 
An overly patriotic and militant diaspora can often prove to be both a resource and a problem for 
sending states. In spite of this or in some cases because of this, sending states are seeing virtue in 
culturally fortifying and nurturing their diasporas. Supporting diasporas culturally is rightly 
being seen by many as an essential prerequisite for other types of engagement and in particular 
economic engagement. The cultural underpins the economic, and countries that seek to lever and 
harness their diaspora for economic benefit only without first attending to the cultural 
inclinations of their overseas populations will find their strategy quickly foundering. Crudely, if 
people do no feel Canadian their chances of playing for Team Canada are lessened. Building the 
diaspora culturally requires a recasting of Canada as both a) a territorialized nation in North 
America and b) a globally networked nation present in countries across the globe.  Whilst 
building the nation among diaspora groupings has emerged as a central theme of many country’s 
diaspora strategies arguably it is in those nations who have suffered a history of trauma and those 
diaspora that consider themselves to be victim diaspora that the greatest success has been 
enjoyed to date. Although it is not always the case, it is diasporic populations that are already 
held together by virulent ethnic nationalism that present the most receptive audiences for such 
programmes. Arguably the Canadian diaspora is held together by a more diluted set of national 
narratives which pivot around varieties of civic nationalism. One need only compare the global 
celebrations which accompany St Patrick’s Day and Canada Day to appreciate the import of this 
point. This does not need imply that the patriotism of the Canadian diaspora is insignificant nor 
that work can be done to fortify the Canadian mindedness of the diaspora nor that the Canadian 
diaspora and more broadly Canada’s global citizens cannot play a role in promoting Canadian 
values around the globe. But it does suggest that the Canadian approach will need to think of the 
complex constituencies it needs to speak to, the varieties of Canadian national identities which 
already exist, and the kinds of social and cultural projects which are likely to resonate best with 
the wide range of overseas Canadian communities which exist.   
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6. DIASPORA AND DEVELOPMENT 
Growing interest in diaspora strategy can be 
traced in part to new thinking in 
Development Studies regarding the role of 
emigration in the development of sending 
countries. Historically, emigration has been 
viewed as a barometer of the success or 
failure of national economic strategies; the 
greater the loss of talent the more 
impoverished the strategy. Policy 
interventions have tended to focus narrowly 
upon arresting the ‘brain drain’ and fostering 
return migration, and increasing the scale 
and improving the deployment of migrant 
remittances. Since the early 1990s, however, 
countries of origin have begun to enquire 
more seriously into possible ways in which 
the energy and talent of émigrés might be 
levered and harnessed from diasporic 
locations. Now, attention is being given to 
increasing philanthropic donations, 
generating ‘roots’ or return tourism, and 
building business networks and diasporic 
investment. Useful reviews of the changing 
status of emigration in debates on the 
competing virtues of national development 
strategies can be found in Lowell and 
Gerova (2004), Larner (2007), Leclerk and 
Meyer (2007), Solimano (2008), Faist 
(2008), Dewind and Holdaway (2008) and 
Bakewell (2009). The World Bank, through 
its Knowledge for Development Programme, 
has played a key role in this transition in 
thinking (Kutznesov 2006). Meanwhile, 
Annalee Saxenian’s (2006) The New 
Argonauts: Regional Advantage in the 
Global Economy, has proven seminal in 
foregrounding the role of brain circulation 
and business networks in transferring 
technology and entrepreneurship from 
Silicon Valley to emerging regions in China, 
India, Taiwan, Israel, and more recently 
Armenia. 
From at least 1945, the movement of skilled 
labour from developing to developed 
countries, invariably referred to as a ‘brain 
drain,’ has attracted much concern. From the 
late 1960s onwards, peripheral economies 
within the developed world also began to 
develop an interest in the meaning and 
negative consequences of out migration. The 
debate between Johnson and Patinkin in 
1968 announced a new moment of doubt and 
questioning (Kutzetsov 2006). Johnson 
sought to outline a Cosmopolitan Liberal 
Model of free international migration which 
lamented unwarranted alarm over 
emigration from the global south and which 
championed the counterclaim that the 
aggregate welfare of all could only be 
enhanced if all barriers to movement were 
lifted. Pantikin, in contrast, insisted upon 
preserving a Nationalist Model of restricted 
and controlled procurement of skilled labour 
from developing countries and fore-
grounded the damage which the flight of 
talent inflicted upon the development 
prospects of the global south. It is clear that 
this debate rumbles on to this day.  
In their review of the impacts of skilled 
emigration on developing countries, Findlay 
and Powell (2001) seek to clarify the 
specific circumstances under which the loss 
of talent might exert a medium to long term 
drag on economic growth. They argue that 
limiting emigration and promoting return 
migration remains an important policy 
option and call on both sending and 
receiving counties (through bilateral and 
multi-lateral agreements) to work to: ensure 
that some migrant streams are truly only 
temporary; restrict migration from especially 
vulnerable and at-risk countries; increase 
accountability among recruitment specialists 
and employers; establish protocols for the 
treatment of foreign workers, and; facilitate 
return migration. Programmes designed to 
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stem emigration and encourage brain 
incubation or circulation remain an 
important part of some countries’ 
engagement with their diaspora. Terrazas 
(2010) provides a useful overview of 
programmes which seek to harness the 
energy of diasporic volunteers even if only 
for a brief duration. At the supra-national 
scale the United Nations’ Volunteer 
Programme (UNVP), the International 
Labour Office’ TOKTEN (Transfer of 
Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals) 
initiative, and the International Organisation 
of Migration’s (IOM) Migration for 
Development in Africa (MIDA) scheme 
attempt likewise to fuse the diasporic 
appetite to volunteer with schemes designed 
to lubricate temporary return.  
Remittances can be defined as private or 
person-to-person transfers from migrant 
workers to recipients in the worker’s country 
of origin. In 2010 worldwide remittances 
flows were estimated at $440 billion, $325 
billion of which were transfers to developing 
countries (World Bank 2011). To compare, 
recorded remittances to developing countries 
were nearly three times the volume of 
Official Development Assistance (Aid), 
almost equivalent to flows of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), and almost four times the 
amount of private loans and portfolio equity 
(World Bank 2011). Moreover, remittance 
flows to developing countries have proven 
comparatively resilient during the global 
economic downturn, falling only by 5.5% in 
2009 and recovering to 2008 levels in 2010 
(World Bank 2011, see also the Hudson 
Institute 2010). In comparison, in 2009 FDI 
flows fell by 40%, whilst private debt and 
portfolio equities fell by 46% (World Bank 
2011).  Remittance flows to developing 
countries are expected to increase by 6.2 
percent in 2011 and 8.1 percent in 2012 
(World Bank 2010). The United States’ 
remains by far the largest source of outward 
flows, followed by Saudi Arabia, 
Switzerland, the Russian Federation, 
Germany and Italy. In 2010, India, China, 
Mexico, the Philippines, and France were 
the top recipient countries (World Bank 
2011). Currently, sending countries are 
attempting to increase gains from 
remittances through; a) lowering the cost of 
transfers and increasing their security; b) 
extending transfer services to communities 
which are ‘unbanked’; c) encouraging 
collective remittances by providing migrant 
organizations with technical and 
organizational support, matching funds, 
marketing skills, and other business 
services; d) stabilising exchange rates; e) 
encouraging more productive uses of 
remittances, and; f) improving the 
functioning of the market for remittance 
services (Newlands and Patrick 2004, World 
Bank 2007). 
Philanthropy can be defined as the private 
and voluntary donation of resources for 
charitable and public good. In order of 
numerical importance, philanthropic giving 
is coordinated and promoted by Private and 
Voluntary Organisations (PVOs), Religious 
Organizations, Corporations, Foundations, 
Volunteer Citizens, and University and 
College Alumni Associations (Hudson 
Institute 2010). In 2008, US philanthropic 
donations amounted to $37.3 billion. Whilst 
some forms of charitable giving have proven 
resilient during the recession, it is clear that 
philanthropy which is based upon 
investments in the stock market and interest 
on assets has proven to be less robust during 
the global economic downturn than 
remittances (Hudson Institute 2010). 
Johnson (2007) has drawn attention to 
diaspora philanthropy as an important subset 
of all philanthropic giving. She identifies 
two types of diaspora philanthropy, which 
she terms diaspora associations and diaspora 
foundations. Diaspora associations are 
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organizations run by and for diaspora 
groupings who provide philanthropic 
support directly and indirectly to their 
members; the most famous example would 
be the Hometown Association (HTA) 
model, especially as managed in Mexico. 
Diaspora Foundations are generally 
established to facilitate charitable giving to a 
specific country region of the world 
(normally the homeland) and include such 
foundations as the American India 
Foundation, the Ireland Funds, the Ayala 
Foundation, the Brazil Foundation, Give to 
Colombia, and Give2Asia. Aikins, Sands 
and White (2009) claim that diasporeans 
contribute to philanthropy especially: by 
providing direct gifts of cash, stock or 
property; by making wills and bequests; by 
promoting specific projects and acting as 
mentors to them; by encouraging 
governments to create more conducive 
conditions for giving, particularly in relation 
to the taxation environment; and by 
investing in capacity building in nonprofit 
organizations thereby assisting the non-
profit sector to adopt best practice in novel 
and increasingly important practices such as 
venture philanthropy, social entrepreneur-
ship, philanthrocapitalism, etc. (see also the 
policy prescriptions offered by Newland, 
Terrazas, and Munster, 2010) 
Tourism is now the world’s fourth largest 
industry (UNWTO 2010a). Between 2000 
and 2008, the number of international 
tourists visiting developing and emerging 
countries grew from 259 million to 424 
million, whilst the number of tourists 
visiting advanced economies increased from 
423 million to 495 million (UNWTO 
2010b). Tourists visits suffered a decline of 
4% in 2009, but have risen again by 5% in 
2010 and are projected to rise again by 4% 
in 2011 (UNWTO 2010a). Return visits by 
diasporic populations to homelands 
constitute an un-quantified, but significant 
section of this lucrative market. According 
to Newland and Taylor (2010) diaspora 
tourism includes a broad spectrum of return 
visits incorporating: medical tourism, 
business-related tourism, heritage (or 
‘roots’) tourism, exposure or ‘birthright’ 
tours, education tourism, VIP tours, and 
peak experience tours.  The consumption 
practices of diaspora tourists differs from 
that of all tourists and tends to generate 
especially high levels of demand for often 
labour intensive or artisanal products.  As a 
consequence diaspora tourism has the 
potential to impact particularly favourably 
on local businesses and local communities. 
The tourist sector also provides 
opportunities for diasporic populations to 
invest in tourism facilities and to open new 
and perhaps less well-known tourist 
destinations to wider audiences. For 
Newland and Taylor (2010) the central 
policy challenges presented by diaspora 
tourism include: providing technical support 
throughout the value chain; easing the flow 
of people and goods across borders (in 
particular through user friendly visa 
schemes) ; supporting research, training, and 
policy development for diaspora tourism, 
trade, and heritage sites; supporting diaspora 
specific marketing and branding efforts; and 
identifying opportunities for high value-
added trade and tourism investments. 
Perhaps the most sought after and certainly 
the most discussed contribution of diasporic 
communities to the development of 
homelands is in the area of business 
investment and business networks. Much of 
the recent excitement has stemmed from 
Saxenian’s (2006) pioneering work on 
ethnic communities in Silicon Valley - 
Chinese, Indian, Taiwanese, Israeli, and 
more recently Armenian - who are 
exploiting their localized social and business 
webs and tying them into homeland public 
and private initiatives. A new breed of ICT 
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engineers and entrepreneurs are transferring 
technology and capital to homelands which 
are now assuming new roles in the global 
technology business ecosystem.  Saxenian’s 
work has served as a catalyst for new 
interest in the role of diasporic groups in 
providing knowledge, mentoring, access to 
markets, technology, foreign direct 
investment, venture capital, and capital and 
portfolio investment (including the purchase 
of national solidarity bonds) to homelands. 
Much of the existing literature on diasporic 
business impacts on homeland economies 
makes use of the idea of business networks, 
formally and informally constituted webs of 
connections and ties between diasporeans 
and key actors in the homeland.  Diaspora 
business networks are overseas networks 
that mobilise the skills, expertise, contacts, 
knowledge, business acumen, and financial 
and political resources to benefit the local 
and global diasporas as well as the 
homeland. Most networks are relatively 
new, perhaps less than a decade old and rely 
heavily on internet technologies, especially 
social networking media. Networks vary in 
their institutional origins (some have grown 
organically whilst others have been 
manufactured by homeland states), 
governance and source of funding (one or 
other or all of state, NGO, and privately run 
and financed), sector (some are professional 
networks which are not sector specific, 
others are targeted towards specific sectors), 
and geographical extent (some have regional 
headquarters and chapters in many countries 
of the world, others are based only in a 
single country). Some countries privilege a 
single network, others benefit from the 
presence of a range of different networks. 
Examples of the various types and functions 
of networks can be witnessed in GlobalScot 
(Scotland), ChileGlobal (Chile), Kea New 
Zealand (New Zealand), Advance 
(Australia), Irish Technology Leadership 
Group (Ireland), the 60 plus independent, 
networks supported by Enterprise Ireland 
(Ireland), The Indus Entrepreneurs (India), 
and ArmenTech (Armenia). 
 A number of useful typologies of diaspora 
business networks exist. According to  
Kuznetsov and Sabel (2006) there are six 
potential diaspora networks: a) Top 
executives networks where senior executives 
of TNCs use their positions to channel 
company investment into source nations; b) 
Mentoring/venture capital networks where 
diaspora members help to finance and guide 
new companies and companies seeking to 
globalize from countries of origin; c) 
Investors networks where diasporeans 
exploit their knowledge of  source countries 
to make smart investments; d) Strategic 
direction setting networks where diasporic 
celebrities and captains of industry join 
think tanks and consultation groups to 
advise and energize national economic 
strategies; e) Return networks designed to 
simulate and lubricate the repatriation of 
talented diasporic groups, and; f) 
Outsourcing networks where disporeans 
who occupy senior positions in TNCs 
outsource work to SMEs in countries of 
origin.  
Newland and Tanaka (2010) provide an 
equally useful taxonomy of diasporic 
business networks, based upon the degree of 
passivity or activity these networks display.  
From most passive, this taxonomy consists 
of: a) networking organizations which 
provide fora for networking and knowledge 
sharing; b) mentoring organizations which 
match SMEs who are seeking to globalize 
with experienced business leaders in 
diaspora, often located in target markets; c) 
training organizations which enlist diasporic 
support in the training and skilling of 
budding business entrepreneurs; d) 
investment organizations which provide 
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capital for company start ups and on an 
ongoing bases, and e) venture capital/ 
partnership organizations where diasporic 
investors assume a heavy and hands on role 
in companies into which they invest.   
Terrazas (2010) provides an informative 
overview of actual and potential ways in 
which diaspora (might) contribute to 
homeland development through strategic 
investment in capital markets (portfolio 
investment). According to Terrazas (2010) 
five existing vehicles are proving effective: 
deposit accounts denominated in local and 
foreign currency; the securitization of 
remittance flows allowing banks to leverage 
remittance receipts for greater lending; 
transnational loans to diaspora groupings to 
allow them to purchase real estate and 
housing in their source countries and; 
diaspora bonds to facilitate long-term state 
borrowing on improved conditions, and; 
diaspora mutual funds which mobilize pools 
of individual investors for collective 
investment in corporate and sovereign debt 
and equity. Terrazas (2010) also proposes 
that additional vehicles for investment are 
possible including issuing debt to sub- 
national governments, developing diaspora 
private equity funds to harness the 
managerial expertise of diasporeans, and 
mobilising institutional investors who 
manage diasporeans insurance and pension 
payments. Terrazas (2010) concludes that 
building and forging trust with capital 
markets is an essential prerequisite for the 
effective operation of these vehicles and 
recommends that home nations align their 
financial regulations and practices with 
international best practice and hire from 
pools of diaspora employed in the financial 
services sectors in key business centres.  
The Irish state has invested heavily and 
successfully in seeking inward investment 
and building business partnerships with the 
Irish diaspora globally.  The Industrial 
Development Agency (IDA) with 14 offices 
outside of Ireland, is responsible for the 
attraction and development of foreign 
investment in Ireland.  While it targets any 
company which might potentially locate in 
Ireland, it has a successful track record of 
recruiting businesses owned and/or run by 
Irish or Irish-descent entrepreneurs and 
managers.  Enterprise Ireland with 31 offices 
outside of Ireland, is the state agency 
responsible for the development and 
promotion of the Irish business sector and in 
assisting international companies and 
entrepreneurs who are searching for Irish 
suppliers or are interested in investing in 
Irish companies.  At present, Enterprise 
Ireland supports, through in-kind or 
financial aid, over sixty Irish business 
networks around the world with over 30,000 
members.  These networks are used to 
support the work of these members whether 
they are located in Ireland or not, but are 
also used strategically to help market Irish 
business and products, to enable Irish 
companies to expand into new territories and 
markets, and to encourage inward 
investment into Ireland. Unlike other 
countries who have placed emphasis on 
developing a single elite business network of 
high-level achievers amongst the diaspora, 
Ireland has adopted a much more plural 
approach that aims to foster a number of 
business networks and to grow a wide base 
of contacts and expertise (although it has 
recently established the Global Irish 
Economic Forum, which is an elite 
network). Some of these were initially 
seeded by Enterprise Ireland such as 
Techlink-UK and Biolink Ireland-USA and 
others were started by the diaspora (such as 
the new Irish Technology Leadership 
Group).  In the main, networks are owned 
and run by their members and function as 
social/business networking sites, many of 
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whom also organise regular face-to-face 
meetings.   
KEA New Zealand is single, pan-global 
network with site-specific chapters and 
sector-focused sub-networks. Kea is a quasi-
autonomous NGO organization that seeks to 
build broad, global networks of professional 
people living overseas.  Established in 2001, 
KEA New Zealand has 25,000 subscribers in 
over 174 countries as of 2011. It has 14 
international chapters in 8 countries, and 
employs four fulltime regional managers to 
conduct its operations in different parts of 
the world.  Its mission is to ‘connect New 
Zealand with its large global talent 
community’ and to ‘contribute to the 
growth, development, and future prosperity 
of New Zealand by sharing knowledge, 
contacts and opportunities’ with its diaspora.  
In 2007, KEA New Zealand launched 
‘World Class New Zealand,’ a programme 
that aims to identify world class role models 
with key business and enterprise skills, to 
facilitate contact between these role models 
and New Zealand businesses, and to build 
new international networks and partnerships.  
In addition, it seeks to access and share 
knowledge with these individuals through 
World Class New Zealand Summits – 
essentially high level think tank meetings – 
held in different countries around the world 
and designed to contribute to domestic and 
diaspora policy development.  Initially 
established by two individuals with private 
funding, Kea is now funded through a mix 
of state grants, private sector donations and 
membership fees.   
A critical part of Scotland’s Global 
Connections Strategy, GlobalScot is an elite, 
global business network composed of 
invited, high achieving members of the 
Scottish diaspora (almost 50% of 
GlobalScot members operate at company 
Chairperson, CEO or President level) 
established and managed by Scottish 
Enterprise. GlobalScot currently has 
over 600 members in Europe, Middle East 
and Africa (221), USA (212), Asia (104), 
and Scotland (80). These members have 
experience in the key targeted sectors: 
Digital Markets and Enabling 
Technologies (81), Life Sciences (99), 
Business Services (87), Financial 
Services (78), Energy (67), Food and Drink 
(22), Government (10), and Tourism (12). 
The scheme works by partnering GlobalScot 
members with Scottish companies, with the 
former providing mentoring, advice, 
contacts and so on to the latter in order to 
help them expand their business globally.  A 
more recent development has been the 
Saltire Foundation that enables selected, 
young business people to undertake 
placements in GlobalScot companies as a 
way of kick-starting or advancing their 
business careers. 
Notwithstanding aspirational claims and 
lofty ambitions, it has to be remembered that 
research into the economic resources and 
opportunities which sending countries might 
procure from diasporic communities is only 
in its infancy. Some examples provide a 
flavour of early findings. Nielsen and Riddle 
(2007) examined why members of diaspora 
populations invest in their homelands. They 
observed that intra-diaspora cultural 
differences, support for diaspora 
organizations, and three types of investment 
expectations, - financial, social, and 
emotional - were key to understanding 
migrant motivations. In their study of 
Chinese migrants in Australia, Tung and 
Chung (2010) show that Australian 
companies with operations in greater China, 
who were either owned by or who offered 
strategic management positions to Chinese 
immigrants tended to have more substantial 
investments, with higher resource 
commitments (wholly owned subsidiaries, 
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joint ventures) and to enjoy improved 
performance. Meanwhile Agrawal et al.’s 
(2010) study of the impact of emigration 
from India on domestic innovation within 
Indian companies concludes that innovation 
rates among returning Indian émigrés is no 
greater than among those who stayed put, 
that knowledge transfer from Indian 
diasporeans is not sufficient to offset the 
losses incurred by emigration, that diasporic 
knowledge transfer has greater benefits only 
for high value added innovations, and 
therefore that skilled emigration has a 
generally harmful effect on the Indian 
economy. Leblang (2010) meanwhile 
provides evidence that even after controlling 
for intervening variables, connections 
between migrants residing in investing 
countries and their home country do 
influence patterns of global investment by 
reducing both transactional and information 
costs. This conclusion is equally true of 
capital or portfolio investment as it is for 
Foreign Direct Investment.  
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d) How can the Canadian diaspora be harnessed so as to improve the competitiveness of 
Canadian business’ and to stimulate Canadian economic development? 
 
With specific respect to Canada’s own development and competitiveness in the global economy 
it would seem that greatest attention might be paid to the potential offered by business networks. 
Arguably remittances from overseas Canadians to Canada are not especially significant beyond a 
number of isolated cases.  Certainly fostering return migration (brain circulation) remains a live 
policy issue; philanthropy, especially with respect to University Alumni networks is important, 
and; there is scope to think about promoting return or roots tourism (not least medical tourism). 
But the more pressing question would seem to be: is Canada doing enough to harness its overseas 
populations in the service of the globalization of Canadian business and might now be a moment 
when a new business network or set of networks might be more consciously created or crafted. 
To be sure formal and organized Canadian relevant business networks exist in many diaspora 
centres, not least in New York, Florida, Silicon Valley, Shanghai, Beijing and Hong Kong. And 
there exists a dense collage of hometown business, trade and investment networks consisting of 
variously formalized, largely covert, and densely meshed webs of family firms  – including the 
‘bamboo networks’ which link Canada with Hong Kong China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and China – which need to be better understood and 
nurtured. But Canada does not have one flagship global business network or an approach to 
birthing and/or nurturing a series of such networks and there is scope to consider if the 
introduction of such a network or networks might be merited.  
The concept of the Global Citizen provides Canada with an opportunity to think about how its 
approach to other countries’ diaspora who dwell in Canada might be playing an important role in 
shaping their development. This is of particular importance in the case of developing countries. 
In promoting the concept of the ‘Global Citizen’ the Canadian government might wish to reflect 
upon its strategies towards the recruitment of talent from the global south, how it might work in a 
limited number of strategic priority areas to improve remittances and their effectiveness, how 
philanthropy from Canada raised by diasporic groups might be better routed home, and how its 
tourist practices carries implications for destination regions. Developing strategies in these 
important areas will not only promote the concept that Canada is acting responsibly and ethically 
in global affairs; it will also contribute to Canadian diplomacy in and relations with important 
sending countries.   
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7. DIASPORA AND CITIZENSHIP  
According to the World Bank (2010) there 
currently exists 215.8 million migrants 
dwelling beyond their countries of first 
citizenship, approximately 3.2% of world 
population. Only 16.3 million or 7% of total 
immigrants are refugees. The top ten 
emigration countries in order of significance 
are Mexico, India, the Russian Federation, 
China, Ukraine, Bangladesh, Pakistan, the 
United Kingdom, the Phillipines and 
Turkey. The top immigration destinations 
are the United States, followed by the 
Russian Federation, Germany, Saudi Arabia, 
and Canada. Interestingly the volume of 
migration between developing countries 
remains larger than movements from 
developing countries to high income OECD 
countries. Whilst still remaining a small 
proportion of the global population,   
population emigration is of sufficient scale 
that it is presenting real challenges to models 
and systems of citizenship which are in 
operation in both sending and destination 
countries. 
The concept of citizenship, of course, has a 
long and fraught history. Our interest is 
principally upon the legal status and 
associated rights and obligations both 
sending and host governments bestow on 
migrant populations. These rights and 
obligations incorporate civil (legal 
protection, guarantee of freedoms, security), 
political (voting and political participation),  
social (social security, education, housing, 
and health services) and economic (work 
and taxation) spheres.   Fox (2005) and 
Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul (2008) 
provide useful overviews of the implications 
of large scale migration for traditional 
models of citizenship. Three concepts would 
seem particularly important today: post 
national citizenship, dual or multiple 
citizenship, and flexible citizenship. 
Postnational citizenship (also referred to as 
Cosmopolitan Citizenship) refers to the 
growing importance of supra-national 
institutions (for example, the United Nations 
or the EU) in the making and defending of 
citizen rights. With the rise to prominence of 
global governance, citizen rights accrue to 
persons and not to residents of particular 
territories.   Dual or multi-citizenship (also 
referred to as Transnational Citizenship) 
refers to the ascription of various kinds of 
citizenship to migrants in both the sending 
country and one or more destination country.  
In the past decade, there has been a 
proliferation of countries who are now 
prepared to offer citizenship to migrants 
without requiring them to renounce or annul 
their citizenship status in their countries of 
origin (see Macklin and Crépeau 2010 for a 
review of global practice)   The concept of 
flexible citizenship,  coined by Aihwa Ong 
(1999), was introduced to capture the 
instrumental and strategic approaches to 
acquiring multiple citizenship which marked 
hyper-mobile and elite Chinese 
entrepreneurs and business leaders who 
circulated transnationally in South East Asia 
specifically. Once thought of as a 
profoundly significant and revered prize, 
and highly charged statement of the extent 
of migrant integration into a new host 
society, according to Ong the hyper-mobility 
of contemporary capital has produced an 
associated ‘cultural logic of 
transnationality’, which in turn has radically 
transformed the meanings of citizenship and 
the methods through which such citizenship 
is earned and used. For some, the normative 
implications of the growing prominence of 
flexible citizenship merit a response. Should 
migrants be awarded citizenship cheaply if it 
is a mere lubricant to their business 
operations?   
A Diaspora Strategy for Canada? Page 38 
 
Sending countries must first consider the 
citizenship rights and obligations they are to 
apply to overseas citizens. Four issues are at 
stake. Firstly, embassy and consular services 
provide a first line of defense and assistance, 
and the geography, resourcing and remit of 
these services needs continual updating. 
Secondly, states are confronted with the 
question of the extent to which they are to 
continue to provide and extend civil, 
political, social, and economic rights to 
overseas citizens, for how long after 
departure, in what form, and to what degree. 
Thirdly, the question of raising taxes on 
overseas émigrés is important. To date only 
the United States’ (although note the 
obligations assumed by certain members of 
the Israeli diaspora) taxes its citizens on 
income created irrespective of their location 
of residence and, even in this case, a number 
of exemptions and exceptions are possible. 
But other taxes related to remittances, 
philanthropy, capital investment, pensions, 
savings, inheritance and foreign direct 
investment are levied more universally. 
Finally, there exists the possibility of 
creating new models of citizenship 
specifically for overseas populations and 
indeed for any population claiming ancestral 
ties no matter how distant. These models 
provide a graduated diminution in rights 
from tangible to symbolic.   
Perhaps the question of voting rights for 
overseas citizens is the most sensitive 
example of the difficulties which countries 
face when extending citizenship beyond 
national territorial borders. The International 
IDEA Handbook (Idea 2007) provides an 
authoritative and comprehensive global 
analysis of the voting entitlements of 
expatriates and prevailing electoral systems 
in most nation states (see also Kull’s 2008 
commentary). Attention is given to four 
kinds of election: the principal legislative 
elections; presidential elections; 
referendums; and sub-national elections. 
This study concluded that approximately 
115 countries extend a significant 
enfranchisement. Some of the countries that 
allow their citizens abroad to vote include 
Italy, France, Australia, New Zealand, the 
US, Britain, the Philippines and Mexico. 
Countries that, like Ireland, do not allow 
their emigrants to vote include India, 
Hungary, South Africa, Zimbabwe, El 
Salvador and Nepal. Most of the nations 
who allow external voting promoted equal 
voting status for everyone, but a minority 
placed restrictions on voting or weighted 
migrants votes differently based upon 
migrants intentions to return permanently 
and/or the time which had elapsed since 
departure.  A range of voting methods are 
employed; in some cases emigrants can only 
vote if they return home to cast their 
preference, others allow for postal ballots 
(post, fax, and e-voting), others accept 
voting by proxy, whilst others again 
organise for citizens to vote in person at 
consulates or embassies.  Eleven countries 
(Croatia, France, Italy and Portugal, Algeria, 
Angola, Cape Verde and Mozambique 
Colombia, Ecuador and Panama) adopted 
electoral systems which permitted 
expatriates to elect their own representatives 
to the national upper and lower parliaments. 
The question of extending citizenship rights 
to diasporic groups carries important fiscal 
and geopolitical implications for sending 
nations. Important sensitivities exist and 
must be kept in mind. On gaining 
independence a key task for the new 
Armenian state was to clarify who within the 
former Soviet Armenia and who within the 
various Soviet Republics might be afforded 
Armenian citizenship. The outcome was 
predicated upon the assumption that those 
who were to be allowed to hold citizenship 
of the new Armenia could not at the same 
time hold citizenship of other states. Dual 
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citizenship was to be rendered unlawful.  In 
November 2005 a constitutional amendment 
was passed by referendum, lifting the 
constitutional ban on dual-citizenship from 
Armenian law. This was followed in 2008 
with the introduction of a law (‘On 
Citizenship’) legalizing a citizen’s right to 
be a citizen both of the Republic of Armenia 
and another state. At the time of the passing 
of the law in 2008, the Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutyun) 
were the most vociferous advocates within 
the diaspora backing the extension of 
citizenship rights to diasporic communities. 
They argued that it was impossible to seek 
to harness the resources, expertise, loyalty 
and lobbying capacity of overseas 
Armenians if such Armenians were at the 
same time considered to be somehow less 
Armenian than Armenians who live in the 
homeland. Among those who remained 
fearful of the implications of the extension 
of citizenship rights to the diaspora were the 
leadership of the Armenian Pan-National 
Movement (HHSh), the Party of former 
President Ter-Petrosian. For the HHSh dual 
citizenship is potentially both ‘extremely 
dangerous’ and fraught with ‘numerous 
risks’.  Critics of dual citizenship fret about 
the potential consequences of widening 
access to citizenship for political 
sovereignty, national security (not least with 
respect to the ongoing conflict over 
Nagorno-Karabakh),   National Military 
Service obligations, and the meaning and 
status of Armenian ethnicity (Antaramian 
2006). Balancing the desire to involve the 
diaspora as much as possible in Armenian 
affairs whilst at the same time preserving the 
territorial sovereignty and integrity of the 
democratic system within Armenia itself 
presents the key challenge.   
Diaspora strategies also must consider the 
promotion and supporting of claims to 
citizenship and entitlements which émigrés 
make in destination countries. Newland 
(2010) provides a panoramic overview of 
diaspora advocacy and lobby groups who 
serve as advocates for migrants needs with 
respect to citizenship status. These groups 
actively organize and participate around 
lobbying and advocacy work, lawsuits, 
fundraising, electoral politics, media control 
and information dissemination and 
demonstrations. A key challenge for 
governments is how best to reach and 
support vulnerable overseas groups whether 
directly or via pre-existing community, 
voluntary, and cultural advocacy 
organisations. Clearly, working with 
existing groups has the benefit of harnessing 
local knowledge and experience. 
Occasionally, however, investing in prior 
advocacy infrastructure merely reproduces 
the status quo, adds fuel to petty turf 
conflicts, and generates inefficiencies.  The 
Lithuanian government through the 
Department of National Minorities and 
Lithuanians Living Abroad, the Chilean 
government through DICOEX, and the Irish 
Government through the Irish Abroad Unit, 
provide concrete examples of the ways in 
which source nations manage these tensions 
so as to ensure that migrants know and 
receive their local rights and entitlements in 
the host country.  
The Department of National Minorities and 
Lithuanians Living Abroad (DNMLLA) 
takes a very proactive role in safeguarding 
and promoting the identity of the Lithuanian 
community overseas. Its target markets are 
Lithuanians living in ‘Lithuanian’ Poland, 
Belarus, and Kalingrad Oblast, exiles from 
World War II and from the rule of the Soviet 
Union and their descendants now living in 
former USSR countries, the ‘classical’ 
Lithuanian diaspora in the USA, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand, and finally the 
post-accession migrants now living in 
Britain, Ireland, Norway, and Spain. 
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Through the strategies of a) Long Term State 
Relations with Lithuanians Living Abroad 
(2008-2020), and b) The Inter-Institutional 
Program for Cooperation with Lithuanian 
Communities Abroad for the Years 2008-
2012, Lithuania is seeking to preserve and 
build patriotism towards Lithuania, 
Lithuanian education, language, and culture, 
and the image of Lithuania overseas. In so 
doing, it aims to promote awareness of and 
protect the welfare rights of Lithuanian 
citizens in destination countries (ensuring 
that they secure access to the services they 
are entitled to). What makes this approach 
so interesting is the fact that the Department 
is simultaneously responsible for overseeing 
foreign-born minorities in Lithuania as well 
as Lithuanian citizens overseas. Coupling 
the two in this way provides for expertise 
and an elevated degree of sensitivity which 
might otherwise have been lacking. 
In acting as and supporting advocates, 
activists, agitators, and ambassadors of 
diasporic communities, sending countries 
also need to confront one important limit to 
diaspora strategy. If handled clumsily 
diaspora strategy presents a threat to the 
sovereignty of host countries who face the 
prospect of foreign interference in their 
internal political affairs. This issue has 
become particularly pronounced in the 
Netherlands where Dutch multicultural 
policy has been strained by claims of 
Armenian and Turkish interference in the 
formulation of law around the denial of 
genocide, and Moroccan support for the civil 
and religious rights of the Moroccan Islamic 
population (Dijkink and Van der Welle 
2009). But as noted, some nations who play 
host to sizeable diasporic populations are 
themselves seeking to exploit the 
knowledge, contacts, linguistic skills, and 
cultural insights of these populations to 
further improve their own global diplomatic 
and foreign policy interventions.  Diasporic 
strategies which lobby for migrant rights and 
who seek to resource diasporic groupings 
and who act as lobbyists are likely to be 
most effective if they work in tandem with 
such host strategies.  
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e) What challenges does the Canadian diaspora present to Canadian citizenship 
policy and how should Canadian approaches to citizenship respond? 
 
For sending states, the question of extending citizenship rights to overseas groups 
risks exposing them to unmanageable fiscal pressures (commitments which are 
difficult to service), domestic political risks (allowing diasporic groups to shape 
election outcomes or gain access to services without taxation), and diplomatic and 
geopolitical strains (more porous borders, being seen to intervene on behalf of 
citizens in countries where that intervention is not  welcome and is likely to breach 
important relations). For some, such risks are especially acute in Canada because a 
proportion of its emigrant population are former immigrants and now naturalized 
Canadians. This has led on the one hand to a set of benign policies which on 
occasions have unconsciously served to discourage and distance diaspora groups. 
More worryingly on other occasions elevated fear has led to a defensive atmosphere 
in which restricting and policing Canadian citizenship more rigorously has taken 
precedence over widening access to citizenship.  But it is obvious that any project 
which seeks to build new relationships between sending states and diasporic 
populations will only be sustainable if both groups feel they have a meaningful stake 
in the project and will enjoy mutual benefits from ensuring its success. Armenia 
demonstrates the importance of getting this balance correct. Countries around the 
world are wrestling with the problem of formulating a progressive and yet secure, 
operational and defensible dual citizenship policy and few seem to have found a 
formula that might attract the accolade of best practice. Perhaps India provides 
Canada with models of citizenship specifically designed for overseas groups, Ireland 
demonstrates how welfare relief from a sending country might reach directly into 
diasporic communities, and the Lithuanian case exemplifies how strong lobbying for 
overseas citizens to ensure they secure their rights and entitlements in host countries 
can be effective. Canada’s challenge is to see citizenship policy in the round, and as 
part of a wider set of debates about Canada-diaspora relations. Arguably nation 
building and the cultural fortification of any diaspora, and how countries deal with 
the citizenship rights bestowed on diasporic members, are integral to contributions 
which that diaspora might make to national economic development. In addition, both 
progressive citizenship law and productive and mutually beneficial development 
projects can contribute in both direct and indirect ways to the goal of nation building 
in diaspora. Finally, both nation building exercises and developmental initiatives set 
the vital context in which debates over limiting and extending citizenship to overseas 
populations take place. In seeking to recover the ‘lost Canadians’ it is imperative that 
Canada does not unwittingly lose its ‘found Canadian’ and ‘affinity Canadian’ 
constituencies.  
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8. CONCLUSION 
Diaspora strategy is rapidly emerging as an 
important new policy field for nation-states 
that have experienced significant out-
migration, often over several generations. A 
growing number of countries are expressing 
an interest in revisiting and rebuilding ties 
with their overseas populations and diaspora 
strategy is becoming something of a central 
priority for many governments today.  A 
diaspora strategy provides a means for states 
to develop and maintain significant 
relationships with overseas citizens, 
descendants and ancestors and other friendly 
constituencies for the mutual benefit of both 
the sending state and the diaspora.  It is a 
policy field whose time has come and it is 
possible to see the rise to prominence of 
such strategies as deriving from the ways in 
which they provoke, enliven and bring to the 
fore three contemporary debates which go to 
the heart of national governance in a 
globalized world: the global competitiveness 
of national economies; the building of new 
nations on both a territorial and a de-
territorial and networked bases, and; the 
development of models of citizenship fit for 
purpose for the twenty first century. It is 
clear that there is a wide range of different 
institutions, strategies, policies, 
programmes, and schemes being developed 
and implemented across countries dependent 
on aspiration, context and circumstance. 
These differences notwithstanding, through 
joint ‘policy transfer’ workshops, seminars, 
publications, and conferences there is 
emerging a sharing of experience and an on-
going global dialogue as to the optimum 
design and implementation of diaspora 
strategies.  
It is evident that Canada is joining the 
international debate on diaspora strategy at 
least a decade behind other pioneering 
nations. This can be to its advantage as vital 
lessons can and are being learned as to pros 
and cons of different approaches, and 
Canada does not have to reinvent the wheel.  
Moreover, there would appear to be little 
institutional legacy or hangover that might 
serve as an impediment to the development 
of innovative, creative, lateral, and novel 
programmes; in some ways Canada is 
beginning with a blank slate and can erect 
new institutions, frameworks, strategies and 
programmes without the friction of history 
bearing on it. Canada then is starting its 
journey from a unique and potentially 
promising port of embarkation. It has the 
capacity to roll out a new strategy and to 
consider from the outset how far the 
Canadian government needs to, or is willing 
to, intervene and on what bases. To this end, 
this report has offered a survey of existing 
international (best) practice for perusal and 
digestion within Canadian policy circles.  
The report concludes by drawing attention to 
8 concrete policy interventions being 
adopted in some of the most proactive 
countries. In no sense does it suggest these 
ought to be of central interest to the 
Canadian case or are the principal and only 
lessons Canada might learn. They are far 
from exhaustive and the reader will note that 
many more possibilities exist and have been 
presented above. But we offer them here by 
way of closing to bring some focus to future 
debate should Canada decide to progress in 
this area.   
1. Definitional matters: The concept of the 
Global Citizen stands as one of Canada’s 
potentially most seminal contributions to 
debates on diaspora strategy. Scotland also 
has a very imaginative and inclusive 
classification of population groupings who 
might fall within its diaspora strategy and 
reference to the Scottish strategy might 
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assist in the further development of the idea 
of the Global Citizen. Scotland’s strategy 
includes Returning Scots who have come 
back to Scotland; New Scots who are about 
to leave Scotland; Live diaspora comprising 
individuals who were born in Scotland or 
have worked/studied in Scotland and are 
now living outside of Scotland; Ancestral 
diaspora who are individuals of Scottish 
descent, and; Affinity diaspora incorporating 
individuals with a direct or indirect 
connection to Scotland but with no 
genealogical link to the country. 
 2. Welfare to vulnerable groups: In the 
recent past, and especially following a 
natural or human disaster, the Canadian 
State has been required to provide 
humanitarian support to vulnerable 
overseas Canadians. Most countries confine 
this support to moments of greatest need and 
work to improve the capacities of Embassies 
and Consulates to respond rapidly and 
effectively. Very few extend welfare 
services directly from the homeland and on a 
routine bases. And yet for a modest 
investment Canada might consider 
developing a pre-emptive and practically 
and symbolically progressive Emigrant 
Support Programme, tied in part perhaps to 
its existing Development/Aid Programmes. 
Here, the Irish case holds some interest. 
Since 2004, The Irish Abroad Unit has 
overseen an Emigrant Support Programme. 
The Emigrant Support Programme resources 
culturally sensitive, frontline welfare 
services, directed at elderly Irish emigrants, 
the undocumented Irish in the US, the 
homeless in Britain, and those suffering 
from particular difficulties, including 
alcohol or mental health issues. The 
programme also funds the Irish Commission 
for Prisoners Overseas, which supports Irish 
citizens incarcerated abroad, and the Aisling 
Return to Ireland Project programme 
managed by the London Irish Centre which 
provides annual supported holidays to 
Ireland and aftercare for long-term, 
vulnerable Irish migrants in London. The 
Irish Abroad Unit also funds and manages 
the Emigrant Advice Network, a citizens 
advice network and source of essential and 
valuable information. 
3. Philanthropy: Beyond the work 
undertaken by the leading Canadian 
Universities (McGill, Toronto, Western, 
Queens, UBC, Simon Fraser etc - around 
10% of whose alumni dwell overseas) 
sourcing philanthropic giving from the 
diaspora for the betterment of Canada is 
not particularly strongly developed. Ireland 
has a weakly developed indigenous 
philanthropic landscape, but has been 
successful in cultivating philanthropy in the 
diaspora.  The Ireland Funds (IF), 
International Fund for Ireland (IFI) and 
Atlantic Philanthropies (AP) are prime 
examples.  Over the past thirty years, the 
Ireland Funds have raised more than €300m 
to be spent on projects in Ireland, IFI more 
than €850m, and AP more than €1.2 billion.  
In the main, these funds have been targeted 
at social disadvantage, education and 
welfare, the peace process in Northern 
Ireland, community development and, local 
economic initiatives with the aim of 
increasing social and economic capital. The 
Ireland Funds provides training courses in 
the area of philanthropic giving and is 
emerging as a world class educator in the 
science and art of diaspora philanthropy.    
 4. Roots Tourism: With a market of 2.8 
million, Canada has the capacity to target 
at least some of is tourism campaigns to its 
overseas diasporic constituencies. Many 
countries are looking to their diasporic 
groups by way of promoting medical 
tourism, business-related tourism, heritage 
(or ‘roots’) tourism, exposure or ‘birthright’ 
tours, education tourism, VIP tours, and 
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peak experience tours. Scotland’s 
Homecoming 2009 was a flagship tourist 
campaign which sought to secure tourist 
visits from diasporeans and thereafter to use 
these visits to build longer term relationship 
between Scotland and its diaspora. It is a 
model which is now being attempted in 
Ireland who is itself now actively marketing 
a Homecoming 2012 event.  
5. Business networks: With a view to 
progressing debate on the virtues of 
introducing a new diaspora business 
network Canada needs to map the full 
range of existing business networks which 
connect the diaspora with Canada and to 
better understand the work these networks 
perform. There is a need to establish if there 
is demand for and a space in the landscape 
for a new flagship Canadian Business 
network. If a business network is required, 
Canada should learn from the experiences of 
countries who have built successful 
networks from scratch; Advance Australia, 
Global Scot, Kea New Zealand, Indus 
Entrepreneurs Network, and the networks 
run by Enterprise Ireland all provide useful 
models to begin the debate. 
6. High Level Consultative Forum – 
Canada does not have a global forum in 
which to bring together its leading 
diasporic thought makers to advice on 
Canadian matters of interest and concern.  
Many countries now have such for a forum. 
A Global Irish Economic Forum was held in 
2009 which brought together nearly 250 of 
the most influential Irish diasporeans from 
around the world to explore how the 
diaspora might contribute to crises 
management and economic recovery and 
how Ireland might create a more strategic 
relationship with its diaspora.  Meanwhile in 
Malaysia in November 2010 China hosted 
its first World Chinese Economic Forum 
(WCEF) under the banner of ‘Building 
Business Linkages and Charting New 
Frontiers’. Aimed at government officials, 
professional institutions, universities and 
think tanks, as well as entrepreneurs, 
professionals and investors from around the 
world, the forum sought to generate strategic 
ideas in support of the assertion of the 
coming of a ‘New Asian century’ and the 
rise of China as a global superpower. The 
World Class NZ Network is an invitation 
only, global network of very senior and 
influential New Zealanders and 'New 
Zealand-friendly' experts committed to 
accelerating New Zealand's development, 
international competitiveness and economic 
growth. The programme attempts to provide 
insight into sectors, technologies and global 
trends relevant to New Zealand. 
7. Honours and Awards: Canada could 
use its honours and awards systems better 
to help build the Candianness of the 
Candian diaspora and to foster Canadian 
mindedness more generally. World Class 
New Zealand is a joint venture between New 
Zealand Trade and Enterprise (NZTE) and 
Kea New Zealand. It consists of two 
separate initiatives the World Class NZ 
Awards and World Class NZ Network. The 
World Class NZ Awards were instituted in 
2003 to honour New Zealanders who make a 
significant contribution to New Zealand’s 
esteem in the world. In 2010 a new 'Friend 
of New Zealand' category was introduced to 
acknowledge the wider affinity diaspora.   A 
new Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (Overseas 
Indians Day) is celebrated on 9th January 
every year (the day in 1915 when Mahatma 
Gandhi returned to India from South Africa) 
and on this day a number of prestigious 
Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Awards are 
made to overseas Indians who have 
contributed to enhancing the country’s 
valour and global status.    
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 8. Citizenship Models: Clearly and 
arguably more so than other countries 
Canada has to find the right balance 
between designing models of citizenship 
which protect the country fiscally 
politically and diplomatically whilst at the 
same time promote overseas citizens to 
engage rather than disengage with home. 
Perhaps a new category of citizenship is 
required. The Overseas Citizenship of India 
(OCI) scheme extends a number of formally 
designated citizenship rights to overseas 
Indians – the categories of Persons of Indian 
Origin (PIOs) and Non-Resident Indians 
(NRIs) have been created. An OCI is 
eligible for a multiple entry, multi-purpose, 
life-long visa for visiting India, he/she is 
exempted from registration with Foreign 
Regional Registration Officers or Foreign 
Registration Officers for any length of stay 
in India, and is entitled to general ‘parity’ 
with Non-Resident Indians in respect to such 
matters as paying tariffs on domestic air 
fares, and entry fees to public facilities, 
access to  national parks, wildlife 
sanctuaries, national monuments, historical 
sites and museums,  and the right to practice 
such professions as doctors, dentists, nurses, 
pharmacists, advocates, architects, and 
chartered accountants. 
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